End of the American Dream

Apologies for the formatting of this post. Blogger.com sometimes does this for no reason.

Before I delve into a presentation by Nobel Laureate and world renown economist, Joseph Stiglitz, I want to cite his recent article "Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%" as well as another article, entitled "Suffer the Young" by and up and coming professor and economist Max Fraad Wolf. Both of these articles share the same theme: America is losing job opportunities and the ones who are hurting the most are the middle class and America's youth, both of which the US needs to to break out of its recession. They are not necessarily apocalyptic articles; however they are neither uplifting nor optimistic about the US economy or the majority of people hoping to find a job in it. This is very disheartening for all of us, especially recent graduates and the unemployed. What needs to be done is the creation of jobs by the US government. The government needs to stimulate job growth - most likely through more spending and raising taxes to justify the spending - and loaning money to small and medium businesses, which are major employers for the middle class. However the recent budget debates in Congress (if you have not heard about this, just google) appear to be heading the opposite way, i.e. cutting public funding in education and innovation, and lowering taxes for the uber rich, basically making it harder for the middle class to survive. In his article, Stiglitz ponders whether the US will rise against the government and its ultra rich, much like the Arab and African world has.

New Case for a Humanitarian Intervention

The United States and the European Union are calling for a "no-fly zone" over Libya as a way to thwart government attacks on revel forces and Libyan citizens. The Security Council has approved the action, with Russia and China abstaining from the vote-however not vetoing the action. This is an interesting occurrence, because in a way, it is a humanitarian intervention, albeit not the kind that was utilized in Kosovo, Somalia, or Sri Lanka. The no-fly zone, which is already implemented as France is already underway in patrolling the skies, is not directly intended to kill Qaddafi-backed forces, although this will probably will occur, but rather as a way to prevent Qaddafi from using aerial bombings - something that the rebel forces cannot defend against. And as in the video below, a jet was already shot down over Benghazi, although it is unclear how it was downed.

How the US and other EU states will participate remains to be seen. Qaddafi is obviously not happy, and has written letters to both Obama and France, the UK, and the UN (collaboratively), claiming that intervening in Libyan domestic affairs will only hurt the region and Souther Europe. If the US gets involved, they may try to mission creep into Somalia, but this is HIGHLY speculative, and this observation comes from un-credible news reports such as this.

Below is a video posted on the BBC that shows a Libyan fighter jet shot down and talks about the no-fly zone humanitarian intervention

Holding Off Migration

Alexander Betts' Global Migration Governance rouses the interest in a governance scheme that will regulate and protect global migration, something no international institution does or can do. Betts says that no one state can address this problem in isolation and thus there needs to be a multilateral agreements to implement migration governance. Currently individual states utilize their power over their own migration processes and issues, such as America's visa system. But global migration governance (GMG) will regulate not just states but also non-state actors whose characteristics are transnational. There will be no 1 size fits all policy because different areas of migration require different rules and way so of thinking. For example, corporate immigration, i.e. the moving of employees to different countries for work reasons is quite different from migrants moving to different countries in pursuit of new jobs and new lives. Within GMG, there will also be trade offs of economics, security, and rights for a new system of regulation, and most importantly will we need a paradigm shift in the way states think about migration. A change in the paradigm opens up the ability to talk about common issues and interests that states have in the migration field, as opposed to what they have against each other.

GMG is not about controlling migration, however. Yet controlling migration is the hot topic in Europe currently, as countries like Italy and France fear the rise of illegal migrants and asylum cases from the violence in Libya, Tunisia, and other countries that are part of the spillover effect of 'democratic uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. The United States has also been involved in controlling the migratory process in North Africa, helping both France and Italy fly Egyptians out of Libya so they would not try to escape to southern Europe. Other people in Libya, who came for work and are waiting to go back to their country of origin, were not so lucky to be flown out by Western governments. Instead they have created a shanty town around the airport in Tripoli, hoping to leave once the violence subsides. Controlling migration is a risky business because it inhibits freedom of movement, an inalienable right bestowed on all people (or at least it should be, because obviously in countries such as North Korea, it is very difficult to emigrate). Perhaps then a global migration governance is something that is very relevant now, because it would better deal with the movement of people in conflict zones. These are the sticky issues that GMG would need to deal with, because promoting rights is not always in the interest of societal well being (i.e. 1 child policy of China) but on most issues, promoting rights is the best way to go.

It's funny - right when one NYT article lays out how al Qaeda has not been an influence in the Arab uprisings and ponders why they might now be; the next day a cleric with alleged ties to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula voiced his opinion that Yemen must be turned into a true Islamic state. It is an interesting development since al Qaeda has not played any role in the protests throughout the Middle East and North Africa (as far as we know, since these protests have been characterized as pro-democracy). Expect for case of Libya, where Qaddafi has blamed al Qaeda and hallucinogenic drugs for the riots and violence, and a government spokesman Musa Ibrahim claimed that rebels in the city of Zawiyah are hiding Qaeda members from the media.

But for the most part until today, there has been no mention of al Qaeda in relation to the uprisings in the MENA in the Western media. This is because the media has been portraying the protesters as embracing democracy and fighting for democratic principles that will soon be implemented in their new governments. However we must remain skeptical of how the new governments will form and with what governing methods. Right now, Tunisia and Egypt are the two countries that have ousted their dictators and new governments are being formed as we speak. It appears Libya is going the same way, and perhaps Yemen is not far behind. Yet we must wait (while the international community tries to influence) the new look of these two governments.

Still, it has been odd that al Qaeda has not even addressed the uprisings. This does not mean al Qaeda is not plotting something while waiting in the wings or will not begin attacking demonstrators in certain countries, especially Libya and Yemen, as a way to instigate sectarian violence, as insurgent groups did in Iraq. In fact, disorder in these countries could be beneficial for AQ as they could more easily maneuver, recruit, propagandize against the current government, and even create cells in cities. Further, if the outcome of events prove disappointing for the protesters, e.g. Egypt and Tunisia become dictatorships once again, civilians will have only one other alternative to get results - engage government forces in battle with organizations that are knowledgeable in this area. To join up with radical groups like al Qaeda is most likely to become influenced by their ideologies and outlooks for an Islamic state. Although this does not necessarily have to happen; people can fight for the same cause and not agree politically.

The debate has begun as to whether the uprisings pose a threat for al Qaeda and its affiliates, because if democracies are to come about in the MENA, citizens will have legal and secure outlets to voice their grievances. Subsequently they would not have to join up with radical groups to fight the government if they disagree, rather they can use their freedom to express themselves in public. On the other hand, if democracy does reign in the region, it could strengthen al Qaeda forces with those who disagree with a 'Western' form of government, one that may not let religion play a lead role in formulating laws and policies. All of this remains to be seen, but should play out soon as the uprisings continue.

PBS - Frontline: "Revolution in Cairo"

An interesting report from good, old PBS. The video is embedded, or you can go to the Frontline website.

A discussion on Kosovo at GPIA: Intervention and State-building

(Left to Right: Anna Di Lellio, Julian (?), Lamberto Zannier, James Rubin)

I attended a discussion hosted by the Graduate Program in International Affairs at the New School University (my alma matar) this past week. The discussion was titled: "Kosovo: The Hazards of Intervention and State-Building" with panelists James Rubin, Former Assistant Secretary and Chief Spokesman, Lamberto Zannier, the current Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and Zannier's Political Director for UNMIK (who was a fill in for Zannier until he showed. Unfortunately his name was not posted, but his first name is Julian, I believe). Although the moderator, Anna Di Lellio, wanted to at first speak about the past and bring the conversation to the present and future of Kosovo, like all discussions with diplomats, it did not go as intended. But nevertheless it was interesting to hear what Rubin, Zannier, and Julian had to say - Rubin was the most loquacious of the three. Here is a summary and brief analysis of the event:

The first question Di Lellio brought to the panelists was whether the humanitarian intervention was successful in light of the problems and failings it has has economically, politically, and socially. Rubin, who was part of Madeline Albright's entourage at the peace discussions between Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, was adamant that it was successful, for two reasons. The first being that it prevented a genocide, which he was sure would have occurred, and second because there was no commercial interest or potential for profit in state-building. Hence Rubin believed the intervention was successful for the US and the West in the moral use of military action. Yet the problems in which Kosovo faces currently have been there since the war's end and it will take some time to solved the Kosovo crisis, which Rubin says won't be over night (or in a decade since the end of the war in 1999, apparently).

Of course it will never be known how many Albanians would have been killed by former Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic had NATO not intervened in Kosovo. And there is also a critique that NATO actually prompted Serbia to kill more Albanians before they their potential defeat by NATO. But the past is the past, and there is a general consensus according to Rubin that atrocities to Albanians in Kosovo would have been worse if NATO did not intervene. (There is two sides to this story, which includes the Kosovo Liberation Army and how they might have stepped up their attacks on the Serbian army and Serb residents because they believed they were backed by NATO no matter what. This is another debatable topic, which you can read about in my Kosovo posts of this past summer).

The second question was addressed to Julian, since Zannier was not present at the time. Di Lellio asked whether one can measure the progress of democracy in Kosovo, especially with the presence of all the state-building and democracy-promoting international institutions. Julian, who works for UNMIK, addressed his answer first toward his organization. He said that UN Resolution 1244, which allowed UNMIK to administer to Kosovo and prepare it for its independence, was never meant to be in place 12 years after implementation. There is now something of a 'checkmate' in Kosovo since Kosovo has its independence and is calling for UNMIK to leave. The UN supposedly wants to repeal 1244 because it has largely fulfilled its mandate, but it is not up to the UN, rather to the UN Security Council. But because Russia and China are on the Security Council, they will not repeal the mandate because this would imply they are recognizing Kosovo's independence, which they do not. (The other members of the SC recognize Kosovo as an independent state.)

This is where things got a bit interesting. Rubin proclaimed that China will eventually change its disposition on Kosovo and recognize it. Julian stated that if Kosovo receives over 100 recognitions from UN member states (it now has 75), there could be a psychological shift within the UN to see it as an independent state. Julian did sound skeptical that this would happen any time soon. Zannier, who showed up by this time, had this to say: Kosovo has a parallel universe, on one side it is the citizens of Kosovo and the other it is the stakeholders (i.e. international community, donors) who expect results. Particularly when one talks about the rule of law in Kosovo, it cannot be just about Pristina, the capital, but about the whole country, and much needs to be done. Although UNMIK is trying to scale down activities, there is still a number of countries who object to Kosovo's independence and there are many political problems that UNMIK can assist with. Hence, UNMIK still survives. Rubin, on the other hand, simply stated that the US needs to get moving on this issue, because the US is still a world leader, and "without US action, it is unlikely international action can be galvanized."

The last big question Di Lellio was able to posit before opening it up to the floor, had to do with the prospect for partition in the North of Kosovo. Zannier answered first. He said the the government of Kosovo's strategy of penetrating the North and trying to convince the Serbs in Kosovo to play along with it is not working. No matter how much money the Kosovo government funnels into the North or the institutions they try to implement, the Serbs are not buying in to becoming a true citizen of the Kosovo government. Serbia however is pushing partition or some sort of special status in the North, like Republika Sprska. There have been rumors of a land swap in the North, meaning North Kosovo will go to Serbia and in return, there will be some land in South Serbia which is mainly inhabited by Albanians that will fall under Kosovo's jurisdiction. Or there has been a proposal of a free trade zone in the North, which would include Mitrovica South (see previous blog posts on this city), but Zannier seemed to dismiss these propositions. He said that territorial adjustment would set a precedent for malfunctioning, multi-ethnic societies, which is potentially destabilizing in these areas. Although Zannier did not give a direct answer or solution, he did say that Kosovo has been relatively stable since independence, which is a good thing. But to address the situation in Northern Kosovo, the root of the problems between Serbs and Albanians in this area must be addressed.

I'll conclude with some brief remarks by Rubin and Julian on what Kosovo means for the field of humanitarian intervention. Rubin says that the international community will have to solve the problems in Kosovo to avoid arguments against the aftermath of interventions, i.e. state-building. But also that in the future, if one threatens force, one may have to use it, which was the case of NATO against Serbia in Kosovo in 1999. Julian ended with saying that the nature of peacekeeping has changed due to the creation of regional and sub-regional organizations like the African Union or Organization of American States. The UN has decreased its peacekeeping operations in the face of these organizations doing the work for them, but it is still the case that in the most dangerous places, like Sudan (but not Somalia), the UN is the only organization that will attempt peacekeeping missions.

This event was taped and should be posted on the GPIA website soon. It will most likely be located under "Announcements" when you scroll down.

Unbelievable! Hosni Mubarak Leaves Office! History is Made!

(Taken from NYT)

Today, the Hosni Mubarak waived his term in the office of the President of Egypt. The crowd goes wild! He is now the former president of Egypt and has asked the military to take charge. Newly appointed Omar Suleiman may also take responsibility in leading new Egypt. He is supposedly residing in his mansion in the Sinai resort town along Egypt's coast. I do not think anyone in the Western world, or the world for that matter, really saw this coming. People have talked about what ifs, but now this is reality. Obama is going to have to make some smooth moves to remain friends with Egypt's new leadership. Although I do not think this will be a problem. Israel on the other hand will have its work cut out to keep the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. They may have to make a lot of concessions now because their 'friend' has now left. It is very exciting to see how things will resonate in the Middle East now. Freedom has been sought (as of now) in Egypt. Let us hope that the new administration progresses this freedom the way the protesters desire.

You can watch live on Al Jazeera: http://english.aljazeera.net/watch_now/.

UPDATE:

Hamas has welcomed Mubarak's resignation and urges the new administration to drop the Gaza blockade and open up the route for freedom of access. This route connects Gaza with Egypt and obviously not everyone is allowed to pass between the borders. This is exactly what is expected to have happened - many other Arab political parties will try to use the new administration to their advantage and leverage the new administration to work towards Arab demands/needs. Of course Western nations will do the same thing. It will be a scramble to see how foreign governments interact with the new Egyptian government (as of now the military). It is said it may take close to a year for a real, new government to become elected, and rightly so. It will take time for Egypt to reform the political process and hold free and fair elections.