This is a semi-book review of Larry Diamond's The Spirit of Democracy. I will probably list it in two to three parts.
Have no fear, democracy is here. Well kind of, is how Larry Diamond argues the prospects of democracy expanding the globe. Although he realizes there are many obstacles to achieving democracy in most regions of the world, there is at least progression and movement toward more democratic means and principles in governance and civil society. Diamond focuses on all the little improvements in societies from Latin America, Africa, and Asia to show that the spirit of democracy is alive and true; however, as he acknowledges, it remains to be seen whether these small steps will produce widespread democratic change. But to get to actual democratic change, society needs to support it, and Diamond believes that the pro-democracy attitude is taking shape. Referencing a 2001 World Values Survey that interviewed people from every region of the world asking to agree or disagree with statements on democratic values, over 80% of all respondents agreed that democracy is the best form of government and every region was over the 50% threshold (most further from 50%) on agreeing that leaders should not be dictators. Diamond utilizes this survey to support his optimism that democracy can, and will, flourish outside the West.
Diamond also focuses on the third wave of democracies, starting in the 1970s with Portugal and consists of countries such as Nepal, the fall of the USSR, Serbia, and Bosnia. This third wave can be sustained, or given into a fourth wave in the future, but he notes that there has been a recent reversal in democratic freedoms throughout the world, including the United States. The Middle East is the only region that has stagnated through the democratic third wave, not having any more freedom. Countries like Pakistan and Russia, which in the 1990s were emerging democracies, albeit with their many flaws, have returned to more autocratic ruling under Vladimir Putin and former president Pervez Musharraf. Both Putin and Musharraf have cracked down on the opposition, freedom of speech, and elections have not been free or fair. Other leading political parties in countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela hold on to power through amending the constitution and election fraud. There is no real explanation for the reverse-democracy movements, but many of these countries have been consolidating power since the start of the new century. Yet Diamond sees through this reversal and believes that these societies are pinning for democratic change.
Diamond uses many sources to support his research, including but not limited to academia, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, think tanks, news articles, and surveys. But he also uses and cites the independent organization Freedom House, which is a leader in analyzing and reporting on every country’s freedom while also supporting democracy and human rights around the globe. He utilizes Freedom House’s research on the freedoms allowed in a given country, consisting of civil and political rights as base for defining and listing democratic countries in order to back his own theories in the book. Additionally, Diamond uses Freedom House’s ‘freedom score’ to describe the positive or negative democratic progress in a country. For example, when writing about South Africa, he leads by stating that Freedom House recently downgraded South Africa’s freedom rating, and from there goes into South Africa’s political and societal problems.
Democracy can spread throughout the world but it will not do so overnight nor will it do so under a façade of democratic institutions, a.k.a. weak democracies. Democracy will only run its true course and be sustained when elements such as fair rule of law, popular sovereignty, and leadership accountability are implemented and followed. In short, these are the democratic values. Elections must be open and free. All candidates should be allowed access to run only because disallowing the opposition to run is counterproductive, such as in Iran and China. Diamond does make a point that elections are not enough to be called a democracy (even if the elections are free and fair). Rather there are certain elements that can make a democracy strong, as well as factors that make one weak.
Diamond points to ten elements that define strong democracies. The list contains aspects such as the right to expression, religion, to run for office, to vote freely; equality of all races and ethnic groups; independent judiciary and due process of law; balance of executive and legislative powers; civilian control over the armed forces, and; a functioning civil society. Countries that possess a majority of these elements are stronger democracies than the rest. Western states display them, although none of these countries can be labeled a perfect democracy, and most, especially America, are far from perfect. On the other hand, a political system like Jordan, where citizens can vote and enjoy democratic elements such as a constitution and elected assembly, but cannot vote the main leader out of power are what Diamond calls a pseudodemocracy. As seen in the name, pseudodemocracies are weak democracies. Weak political systems like Jordan’s obviously has consequences for citizens – they cannot effectively have a say in governing the country nor do they have a means of recourse if they oppose the rule of the leader. King Abdullah II retains authoritarian power even though his country has been influenced by the West and has opened up for some democratic values. A more proper term for Jordan may be an electoral authoritarian regime because the opposition does not really have a chance to campaign legitimately and are also bullied and threatened. Zimbabwe can fall into this category as it held elections (though far from free and fair) in 2002 and 2008, and supposedly has an elected assembly; yet Mugabe’s regime is not considered democratic. There is also racial and civil strife, no accountability on the leadership level, and corruption on all state levels in Zimbabwe. Again, just because a country has electoral systems that border free and fair, this does not constitute a democratic government. In sum, weak democracies exist because of the elites and their power structure, whereas strong democracies flourish not only because the leaders are willing to follow the law, but also because there is an active civil society.
But to get from a pseudodemocracy to a true democracy, it must be promoted, and there are multiple ways to do so. The most effective method is through regional cooperation and organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) European Union (EU) and its affiliate organizations, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The OAS has developed a regional approach to aiding or helping sustain democracy by sending observer missions to countries that may be in crises to alleviate the situation and dissuade a democratic pullback. Diamond notes that the observer mission leaves a lot to be desired, and much more is needed in OAS’s agenda to efficiently promote and develop democracy. The ICC is also a good example of an international organization that benefits the international community and promotes a democratic judicial system as well as rule of law.
Then there is political and developmental assistance that usually comes from other countries or organizations to a target country. Political assistance and developmental assistance are different, though both are usually tied to giving money. Of course no matter how much money or assistance is provided to a country, that country must have the political will to change its current political systems to a more democratic one. Yet these organizations do not just dole out money; the country must be viewed as either a strong potential candidate for democracy or be an emerging democracy. Organizations like USAID and UNDP can provide both, but the National Democratic Institute and European Commission affiliates, such as the Liaison Offices to potential EU candidate countries, focus on political change. Political assistance can include projects like improving judicial oversight by training judges, improving policing by training police, and domestic election monitoring. Development assistance usually consists of economic and financial projects.
Granted many current democratic states support and donate to various organizations like USAID and UNDP, a state’s foreign policy is also a good advocator of democracy – as long as it is not hypocritical. For example, the US urges many nations to transition to democracy with its help, yet US foreign policy also supports monarchies like Saudi Arabia and dictators like Hosani Mubarak of Egypt. This is conflicting and is used as political support for elite leaders running on anti-American campaigns. Nevertheless, any type of democratic assistance regardless of where it comes from or how it is issued should be concentrated on local civil society. Democracy building is more effective from the ground up and sometimes it is better to advert from funding the government.
In fact, just donating money directly to the government is one of the not so effective ways to promote democratic change. If the government is corrupt or lacks the will to change, then most likely the money will just go to the elites’ pockets. A good example of this is Pakistan, where close to $10 billion of aid money from the US has been donated to the country and not much of it is accounted for. This is a case in point in not using aid money efficiently. But if there are plans to aid a poor country in transition to democracy, one should not set absurd expectations for the country to meet goals. For instance, if electoral fraud is common, then it is infeasible to demand that the next election be fraud-free; rather if oversight improvements are made and ballot boxes are not stuffed as much as previously, it is a step in the right direction. Democratic change takes a while (230 years and counting for the US), it will certainly not take place overnight. At the same time one should not set expectations too low, provide aid unconditionally, or rely on promises that things will get done from the ruling elite. Gullibility and a lack of oversight of the aid program can give way to corruption and embezzlement. Therefore when providing democratic assistance, be it political or economic, there needs to be the right scale approach. Depending on the size of the country, the right amount of money and manpower needs to be utilized. Providing $30 million dollars may help the citizens of Malawi but it will only make a dent on the citizenry of Nigeria.
If democracy is promoted effectively to non-democracies, and here Diamond focuses on authoritarian states, it will help break the authoritarian changes but may not necessarily guarantee a regime change for the better. To successfully convert a state to democracy external and internal factors must both be present. External factors, like those mentioned above, would be that of economic and political assistance offered from other countries and organizations. Yet it needs to be leveraged, like a stick and carrot approach, where the funding for the government must be used to govern and must be distributed in a way that affects the majority of the population. In other words there needs to be conditionality, where the more cooperative and responsive governments get more money, usually in advance, for preparing the state to transition to more democratic means. Another leveraged policy tool is sanctions, which have been applied numerously to North Korea and Iran, but has not effected change thus far. More importantly, regional help from friendly neighboring states can transfer knowledge and democratic models across borders, perhaps taking part in a “snowballing effect,” as was seen in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. Neighboring states can also apply foreign policies that encourage liberalism and human rights. But it must be noted that foreign policy and leverage/conditionality may not affect larger nations like China and Russia, and although democratization by force may be an option, after Iraq and Afghanistan it is ill advised.
Diamond also focuses on the third wave of democracies, starting in the 1970s with Portugal and consists of countries such as Nepal, the fall of the USSR, Serbia, and Bosnia. This third wave can be sustained, or given into a fourth wave in the future, but he notes that there has been a recent reversal in democratic freedoms throughout the world, including the United States. The Middle East is the only region that has stagnated through the democratic third wave, not having any more freedom. Countries like Pakistan and Russia, which in the 1990s were emerging democracies, albeit with their many flaws, have returned to more autocratic ruling under Vladimir Putin and former president Pervez Musharraf. Both Putin and Musharraf have cracked down on the opposition, freedom of speech, and elections have not been free or fair. Other leading political parties in countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela hold on to power through amending the constitution and election fraud. There is no real explanation for the reverse-democracy movements, but many of these countries have been consolidating power since the start of the new century. Yet Diamond sees through this reversal and believes that these societies are pinning for democratic change.
Diamond uses many sources to support his research, including but not limited to academia, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, think tanks, news articles, and surveys. But he also uses and cites the independent organization Freedom House, which is a leader in analyzing and reporting on every country’s freedom while also supporting democracy and human rights around the globe. He utilizes Freedom House’s research on the freedoms allowed in a given country, consisting of civil and political rights as base for defining and listing democratic countries in order to back his own theories in the book. Additionally, Diamond uses Freedom House’s ‘freedom score’ to describe the positive or negative democratic progress in a country. For example, when writing about South Africa, he leads by stating that Freedom House recently downgraded South Africa’s freedom rating, and from there goes into South Africa’s political and societal problems.
Democracy can spread throughout the world but it will not do so overnight nor will it do so under a façade of democratic institutions, a.k.a. weak democracies. Democracy will only run its true course and be sustained when elements such as fair rule of law, popular sovereignty, and leadership accountability are implemented and followed. In short, these are the democratic values. Elections must be open and free. All candidates should be allowed access to run only because disallowing the opposition to run is counterproductive, such as in Iran and China. Diamond does make a point that elections are not enough to be called a democracy (even if the elections are free and fair). Rather there are certain elements that can make a democracy strong, as well as factors that make one weak.
Diamond points to ten elements that define strong democracies. The list contains aspects such as the right to expression, religion, to run for office, to vote freely; equality of all races and ethnic groups; independent judiciary and due process of law; balance of executive and legislative powers; civilian control over the armed forces, and; a functioning civil society. Countries that possess a majority of these elements are stronger democracies than the rest. Western states display them, although none of these countries can be labeled a perfect democracy, and most, especially America, are far from perfect. On the other hand, a political system like Jordan, where citizens can vote and enjoy democratic elements such as a constitution and elected assembly, but cannot vote the main leader out of power are what Diamond calls a pseudodemocracy. As seen in the name, pseudodemocracies are weak democracies. Weak political systems like Jordan’s obviously has consequences for citizens – they cannot effectively have a say in governing the country nor do they have a means of recourse if they oppose the rule of the leader. King Abdullah II retains authoritarian power even though his country has been influenced by the West and has opened up for some democratic values. A more proper term for Jordan may be an electoral authoritarian regime because the opposition does not really have a chance to campaign legitimately and are also bullied and threatened. Zimbabwe can fall into this category as it held elections (though far from free and fair) in 2002 and 2008, and supposedly has an elected assembly; yet Mugabe’s regime is not considered democratic. There is also racial and civil strife, no accountability on the leadership level, and corruption on all state levels in Zimbabwe. Again, just because a country has electoral systems that border free and fair, this does not constitute a democratic government. In sum, weak democracies exist because of the elites and their power structure, whereas strong democracies flourish not only because the leaders are willing to follow the law, but also because there is an active civil society.
But to get from a pseudodemocracy to a true democracy, it must be promoted, and there are multiple ways to do so. The most effective method is through regional cooperation and organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) European Union (EU) and its affiliate organizations, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The OAS has developed a regional approach to aiding or helping sustain democracy by sending observer missions to countries that may be in crises to alleviate the situation and dissuade a democratic pullback. Diamond notes that the observer mission leaves a lot to be desired, and much more is needed in OAS’s agenda to efficiently promote and develop democracy. The ICC is also a good example of an international organization that benefits the international community and promotes a democratic judicial system as well as rule of law.
Then there is political and developmental assistance that usually comes from other countries or organizations to a target country. Political assistance and developmental assistance are different, though both are usually tied to giving money. Of course no matter how much money or assistance is provided to a country, that country must have the political will to change its current political systems to a more democratic one. Yet these organizations do not just dole out money; the country must be viewed as either a strong potential candidate for democracy or be an emerging democracy. Organizations like USAID and UNDP can provide both, but the National Democratic Institute and European Commission affiliates, such as the Liaison Offices to potential EU candidate countries, focus on political change. Political assistance can include projects like improving judicial oversight by training judges, improving policing by training police, and domestic election monitoring. Development assistance usually consists of economic and financial projects.
Granted many current democratic states support and donate to various organizations like USAID and UNDP, a state’s foreign policy is also a good advocator of democracy – as long as it is not hypocritical. For example, the US urges many nations to transition to democracy with its help, yet US foreign policy also supports monarchies like Saudi Arabia and dictators like Hosani Mubarak of Egypt. This is conflicting and is used as political support for elite leaders running on anti-American campaigns. Nevertheless, any type of democratic assistance regardless of where it comes from or how it is issued should be concentrated on local civil society. Democracy building is more effective from the ground up and sometimes it is better to advert from funding the government.
In fact, just donating money directly to the government is one of the not so effective ways to promote democratic change. If the government is corrupt or lacks the will to change, then most likely the money will just go to the elites’ pockets. A good example of this is Pakistan, where close to $10 billion of aid money from the US has been donated to the country and not much of it is accounted for. This is a case in point in not using aid money efficiently. But if there are plans to aid a poor country in transition to democracy, one should not set absurd expectations for the country to meet goals. For instance, if electoral fraud is common, then it is infeasible to demand that the next election be fraud-free; rather if oversight improvements are made and ballot boxes are not stuffed as much as previously, it is a step in the right direction. Democratic change takes a while (230 years and counting for the US), it will certainly not take place overnight. At the same time one should not set expectations too low, provide aid unconditionally, or rely on promises that things will get done from the ruling elite. Gullibility and a lack of oversight of the aid program can give way to corruption and embezzlement. Therefore when providing democratic assistance, be it political or economic, there needs to be the right scale approach. Depending on the size of the country, the right amount of money and manpower needs to be utilized. Providing $30 million dollars may help the citizens of Malawi but it will only make a dent on the citizenry of Nigeria.
If democracy is promoted effectively to non-democracies, and here Diamond focuses on authoritarian states, it will help break the authoritarian changes but may not necessarily guarantee a regime change for the better. To successfully convert a state to democracy external and internal factors must both be present. External factors, like those mentioned above, would be that of economic and political assistance offered from other countries and organizations. Yet it needs to be leveraged, like a stick and carrot approach, where the funding for the government must be used to govern and must be distributed in a way that affects the majority of the population. In other words there needs to be conditionality, where the more cooperative and responsive governments get more money, usually in advance, for preparing the state to transition to more democratic means. Another leveraged policy tool is sanctions, which have been applied numerously to North Korea and Iran, but has not effected change thus far. More importantly, regional help from friendly neighboring states can transfer knowledge and democratic models across borders, perhaps taking part in a “snowballing effect,” as was seen in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. Neighboring states can also apply foreign policies that encourage liberalism and human rights. But it must be noted that foreign policy and leverage/conditionality may not affect larger nations like China and Russia, and although democratization by force may be an option, after Iraq and Afghanistan it is ill advised.
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