AMISOM in Somalia

Somalia is consistently ranked the #1 failed state in the world by Foreign Policy and most news reporters label it the most dangerous place in the world (not to mention K'naan loves to rap about how Mogadishu is ueber-gangster). Without going into the history of Somalia's ongoing civil strife, warlordism, and terrorism, this is what is happening currently in a nut shell: The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a force comprised of around 7-8,000 troops (any news paper article will have a different number of troops and the AMISOM's two websites do not list the exact figure) from Uganda and Burundi that are mandated to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as well as the Somali population around the capital city Mogadishu. For the most part, AMISOM is fighting the extremist group based on Islam, Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (better known as al Shabaab or 'the youth'). But AMISOM also fights Hizbul-Islam, another insurgent group that may come into cahoots with al Shabaab. The main problem with AMISOM is that this military is only making minimal progress against al Shabaab and only controls a few blocks around the capital, mainly where the government buildings and airport are located. Though, at times, this minimal progress concerns al Shabaab, who are now paying foreign recruits $250 a month, $50 more than domestic recruits, to fight with Shabaab against AMISOM.

From reports and interviews given by AMISOM commanders, this military is underfunded, undermanned, and under-supplied. Undermanned is the most accurate complaint as it has taken 3 years from AMISOM's inception in 2007 to finally accumulate a number of troops close to the 8,000 that is was originally mandated. This past summer, Uganda has called for supplying up to 20,000 soldiers altogether, but that it and Burundi cannot be the only countries to supply these troops. Actually Uganda said that if the US will support them, they will ready themselves to send another 10,000 troops to Somalia. The US, through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, have remained ambiguous about the US contributing directly to this 10K increment, but still insist that the US will keep supporting AMISOM and the TFG financially and diplomatically. (As a side note, the US does not want to get involved with Somalia because it cannot handle spreading its troops even wider across the world. Additionally there are 2 other wars the US needs to focus on). The total money spent on AMISOM between America and the European Union is between $400-500 million. I am not a military financial expert, but with this type of money received for the past 3 years, it would seem that more progress would have been made in Somalia. But alas, money does not equal the will to fight, and fight effectively.

AMISOM is directly concerned with "peace" on the ground in Mogadishu, but has played a minor role in fighting piracy in conjunction with the EU's Operation Atalanta. There boats aren't the greatest ships out there, basically a narrow boat that can carry approximately 6 men with a motor on one side and a machine gun on the other. But at least there is a presence, albeit small, and Ugandans are training the Somali military with this equipment, in this regard. In fact, AMISOM is training the newly developed Somali army and police forces in Mogadishu. With the help of France, Italy, Dyncorp, and Burundi, training military training is taking place for Somali security forces. News articles and interviews suggest that it will be years before the Somali military can successfully take over the AMISOM mandate. There are other accounts of Shabaab infiltrations, desertions, and death threats. It remains to be seen how things will play out for AMISOM in Somalia, as well as the Somali security forces, but it does not look as hopeful as all thought it would be when AMISOM was first commissioned in 2007.

This is the second part of the paper, discussing Algeria's road to state failure. This is not implying that Algeria is a failed state, but that is exhibits those factors of a failed state discussed in the previous post.

Algeria is a unique case as it experienced a violent struggle for independence, underwent a long period of calm and economic progress, opened its doors to democracy, but remains a military autocracy. After the civil war with France for independence in the 1950s, the new post-colonial government led by Ben Bella and the National Liberation Front (FLN) could not use the newfound Algerian nationalism to its advantage as the FLN splintered due to arguments of who and how the country should be run. Like most post-colonial governments the FLN ran a (Islamic) socialist campaign with policies intended to lift the poor out of poverty and into a modern state. During Ben Bella’s reign, no social and economic services were provided because there was no political will to deliver the services. What happened in Algeria next is much like what has happened to many other African countries on the verge of failure, the military stepped in and consolidated political power within its own institution. In 1965, a military coup led by Boumedienne ended Ben Bella’s reign and assumed the political, economic, and social problems inherited from the civil war. Boumedienne presided over Algeria under the FLN banner as well because only one-party rule was allowed at the time.

Boumedienne’s presidency until the late 1970s exhibited a relative peace and successful economic development. He developed Algeria through industrialization, specifically though oil and gas exports that garnered economic growth, moving Algeria through the ranks of other African countries to becoming a modern, industrialized state. Boumedienne successfully turned Algeria around from the political, social, and economic demise that came under Ben Bella’s regime. But when Boumedienne died in the late 1970s during the oil crisis, Algeria again began to slump economically, losing revenue on oil while experiencing high unemployment and inflation. There were also food shortages and cuts in electricity and water, which does not make for a happy population.

Unfortunately for the Algerian citizens, all this turmoil could not just be blamed on the faltering economy. The new military and FLN leader, Chadli Benjedid took over after Boumedienne’s death and decided that economic and political reform was needed to get out of Algeria’s crisis. The reforms did not have the intended outcomes, and actually led to governmental corruption, a large dependence on oil, and a growing foreign debt that needed to be repaid. Algerian citizens were growing largely frustrated with the inefficiency of the FLN, and this culminated in the 1988 work strikes and food riots. The FLN called in the army to restore order, and they killed and tortured thousands of Algerians, which further delegitimized the government in eyes of public. What resulted was an appeasement of the public by the FLN, who instituted multi-party elections in 1991, with the belief that they would win regardless. To the detriment of the FLN, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an opposition political party won the first round of elections due to large scale disdain for the FLN. As background, FIS is an Islamic political party that wants to do away with all things Western in Algerian society, specifically democracy, and runs on a platform of social justice and creation of jobs. FIS was barred from the second round of elections as the military again stepped in and ensured the FLN remained in power. The military eventually banned all political parties based on religion in March 1997.

This move to ban the FIS from running resulted in another civil war that claimed close to 150,000 Algerian lives and also deposed the incumbent president Benjedid. Yet some democratic processes remained intact after the canceled elections of 1991, namely the multiparty political system and freedom of the press. Throughout the 1990s, the military held support from a portion of the population who were suspicious of the FIS and their Islamic outlook, yet still partook in a policy of repression and violence when necessary in Algeria. Needless to say, throughout most of Algeria’s post-colonial history, the military and state-security services have been the arbiters of power in Algeria and backed all presidential candidates that won elections in the 1990s, some which were FLN military leaders. The military was able to consolidate political power unto itself because it was the one institution in Algerian society that did not crumble due to poor economic strategy and social disorder; in fact the military cashed in on the oil wealth, using this money to pay its soldiers as well as pay rents to other actors willing to accept military direction. Lastly, the Algerian military, like many other African militaries in power, used the threat of internal disorder to strengthen its power grip on society.

According to Ayittey, a dispute over the electoral process and a resulting military intervention is usually the first steps to the destruction of a (African) country. The usual reason is because the military was unwilling to give up its power and wealth it took in from oil exports. The late 1990s up to recent times has actually seen the decrease of military control over the political system under the independent president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who himself was backed by the military when he first won presidency in 1999. He has amended the constitution so that there are no term limits for presidents, consolidated power away from the military, reaps the benefits of the export earnings of oil, and is becoming the ultimate autocrat. Although Bouteflicka tries to promote open elections, his election wins in 2004 and 2009 were not considered free and fair by opposition parties.

There may be little hope for Algeria that the UNDP’s assessment putting Algeria on the “brink of complete social disintegration” (Ayittey 13) will not become true. A 2004 survey in Algeria found that approximately 85% believe democracy is the best system of government for their country but also split on whether religion should influence political decisions. But this belief in democracy has not changed the political or economic system in Algeria. The government controls most of the economy and is weary of foreign direct investment. There is still government corruption pertaining to infrastructure and other development projects, high unemployment, and social upheaval regarding opposition terrorist factions attacking the government. Moreover there is a large amount of the population that lives in poverty and is awaiting the government to improve their living standards. What Algeria needs is to liberalize the economy to spur investment and development, which in turn would lead to social changes and perhaps a culture that resembled the Boumedienne era, which would then lead to a more efficient democracy.

Contributing Factors to Failed States

This is the another analytical paper that concentrates on the literature provided in Jeffrey Herbst's States and Power in Africa and George Ayittey's Africa in Chaos. The paper attempts to answer the following question:

"What factors contribute directly to the creation of failed states? What issues emanate in Algeria?"

This will be given in two parts, the first covers some of the more dominant factors of state failure and the second part will be on Algeria.

States fail, though not often, but it is more common for states to come to the verge of failure. Herbst and Ayittey expose the process and the comprising factors that lead to state failure, particularly in Africa. The process and factors are not the same in every country, but they follow a general pattern. It usually begins with countries that promise social and economic change for all but fall prey to authoritarianism, which leads to corruption and paranoia, which then leads to more corruption and repression of society. Underdevelopment, weak rule of law, lack of political will, lack of personal security, and exclusion of large portions of the population from wealth are some factors that exacerbate the road to state failure. Naturally states on this road can reverse their trend and progress on a path toward social, political, and economic stability, such as Rwanda, but it is not too often that this occurs. What is most common, as can be concluded by Herbst and Ayittey, is that a state remains stagnant, hoping to one day get out of its hole rather than sliding further into state failure (see Somalia).

Herbst depicts two factors that can bolster a state as well as induce a state to fail if not applied properly: costs of expanding a state and buffer mechanisms. A government wants to use a proper cost-benefit ratio to expand its power outward from the capital that uses the least amount of resources or existing institutions and infrastructure. If the government overpays in this regard, it will need to make up the money in another sector, such as exports or taxes. Any money sent to the countryside needs to be utilized efficiently, perhaps creating new infrastructure, markets, and thus towns or cities with local governments. If not, like in many countries in Africa, money for projects will be bribed or stolen away with an end result of delegitimizing the government as projects do not get completed. There is a need for strong control over fiscal and monetary policies, unlike government actions in Nigeria and Ghana, but there is also a need for the government to exert political will to galvanize the countryside and foment a nationalism that will support the government. If not, the government will be relegated to ruling only those cities and villages that contain government infrastructure in place and no patriotic ties between the government and the population will exist.

As a complement to the political will argument, boundaries as a buffer mechanism of a state that regulate the flow of goods and people into and out of the state. A leader of a state naturally wants control over the borders and therefore boundaries are securitized, especially due to possible invasion from external forces as well. If boundaries are not controlled there is no rule of law and chaos and illegal happenings will ensue. As Herbst points out, secure boundaries develop other institutions, such as currency exchange and citizenship rules. The hinterlands – the sparsely populated regions outside the capital – the people that inhabit these lands and the surrounding borders are important because to successfully rule a state, the tentacle of power must stretch from one side of the country to the next. If those in the hinterland are not affected by rule of law and in essence can act without abiding by laws that the ruler sets, then there is no control over these areas. The hinterlands need to be included to make a holistic state in order to create a nationalism that will legitimize the state and induce the citizens to support it through labor and money.

In other words, the problem of weak states is that power extends only from the capital city, rather than multiple cities throughout the country. To explain, it is what Herbst calls that “center-periphery divide” (pg 20), meaning that the land on the periphery of the capital (the center) is not relevant in the eyes of the authority. Granted Herbst thinks that the borders of all African states need to be redrawn as they were implemented by European colonialists, these states still failed to inspect their boundaries and what their territory encompassed to see what they could develop or fund. Furthermore, what many African as well as some Middle Eastern rulers forget was that one cannot assume that control of the capital equates to sovereignty over the entire country. There are a few problems with this governing approach that helps aid in country destruction. First, there are no local governments in other regions to act as an arm of the government. In Africa specifically, colonists did not leave local institutions intact, only state institutions; so there may be a few other cities and urban centers with local municipal governments, but the majority of the hinterlands are left without any federal governing institutions. With the projection of power concentrated from the capital and only extending to a few other cities, it is very hard to establish rule of law throughout the hinterlands, and hence gain political influence. Therefore coercion and co-optation of the local leaders and tribal chiefs was a way to dictate rule in these areas. Herbst states that through coercion any type of authority or authoritative presence can be displayed in the hinterlands.

Another problem of the center-periphery divide is that governments only develop the urban areas while providing goods, resources, infrastructure, markets, and state privileges. Particularly not assembling roads and other related infrastructure is a major hindrance to the projection of power and influence. If there are no efficient means to transport goods, commerce, and information, then citizens are at a loss for economic prosperity. The collapse of infrastructure and lack of investment causes states to fail by isolating those peoples and tribes in the hinterlands, thus delegitimizing the government. The center-periphery divide also encourages dense populations near the capital and other urban centers which are created by the migration of the hinterlands population to these areas. If there is no economic development throughout most of the country, then there are only a few places to look for employment. Further, if the only jobs available are government jobs, then the pull factor towards the capital is even stronger. A lack of development in the hinterlands, including minimal infrastructure will not unify the population. The only time African leaders try to mobilize the hinterlands are during election periods, which do not give one a very popular support base. Granted constructing infrastructure is costly and difficult, such as the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, efforts should be made to connect all regions of a country to stimulate economics and unity.

Lastly, but still in connection with the center-periphery divide, is the problem of governments exploiting natural resources and not distributing the wealth evenly throughout the country. This can be done in three ways: 1) the government elites pocket the money, 2) the money is not allocated to the region where the resource is located, and 3) the money is only allocated to the area where the resource is located. In some cases, such as with Sudan and Nigeria, the minority is settled in areas with abundant oil resources and want to reap the benefits of the resource, thus causing conflict with other regions who want a piece of the pie. In Sudan, there will now be a referendum for the south to leave the north, which is causing anxiety in the north as the south holds all the oil reserves and the money. The scenario in Nigeria is the opposite of Sudan, the oil from the southern province is tunneled to the north to be developed and distributed. The resulting money is kept in the north with no reinvestment in the south. Cases such as Nigeria cause political tensions that will eventually erupt into situations like Sudan, both being detrimental to state success.

As can be seen, it is ultimately the mismanagement of money that leads a state to failure. Ayittey demonstrates the strategy of elites in Africa who try to imitate the West and those elites who once ruled over African countries. By doing so, they spend money that the state does not have on useless and personal items, such as fancy cars and technological gadgets as well as on status symbols for the capital to make it stand out more like a Western capital city. A prime example to Ayittey’s argument is that of President Bokassa of the Central African Republic who paid $20 million of state money to crown himself emperor in 1976 just so Africa had an emperor. Lavish and unchecked spending by presidents and elites can only aid in the demise of a state. But unfortunately this is what tends to happen in countries controlled by power-hungry rulers. They see state revenue as their own wealth, spend it unproductively, and exploit it as though it will never dry up. The money source never comes from a bustling economy, which should be a key indicator that the state is not functioning at capacity, but nevertheless money came from sources such as rents and taxes, corruption/bribes, abundant resources/exports, or foreign aid (or a combination of these).

Collecting rents from in-country businesses and on exports can lead countries to collapse as the rent money is usually pocketed directly by a select few elites rather than being distributed evenly throughout the country. In short, the companies are paying the elites bribes to do business. In fact, Ayittey points out that rent-seeking in Africa is so bad that there is no opportunity for future rent-seeking rulers because the current leaders are milking every penny they can receive. Granted that rents are seen as corruption, there are still other massive amounts of corruption that can degrade the fiscal stability of a state, especially when the state is seen as the sole provider of jobs. The problem is that head of states use privileges and power for selfish reasons, such as ensuring they are paid handsomely for any government contract they hand out. These actions trickle down to all state employees, who may charge extra fees for transportation tickets or entrance to ministry buildings, such as was the case in Nigeria with its security personnel.

The resource curse occurs when states with abundant resources do not use the money efficiently or for democratic transition purposes. This is particularly true in many African countries, such as Sudan, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Nigeria. The money from resources is not spent on state-building projects, but on personal investment or internal security measures. Resource-less countries (and sometimes even resource abundant countries) seek economic solutions from external factors, specifically foreign aid money. The problem that comes with receiving aid money is that the government should use it toward some sort of development but does not do so. Rather corrupt governments see foreign aid as revenue, spending more than their collected revenue from taxes and exports. Further governments will focus less on economic inputs in the economy that would supplement the foreign aid as income because it is assumed that foreign will always be given. This reasoning ultimately leads to deficit spending, increasing debt for countries that lack the economic output for repayment. Overall, the mismanagement of monetary resources creates an environment in which productive economic inputs, such as industry, agriculture, and the service sector are shunned by greedy leaders to the detriment of the average citizen.

There is one other form of money mismanagement in which both Herbst and Ayittey focus, that of state security. Security, both external and internal, but specifically internal is a cost that become overpaid and overinvested, which then takes away resources that would otherwise be better allocated to areas of state-building and economic development. One the one hand, there will always be an external threat somewhere, but spending on security and defense should be proportionate to the potential threats, because as can be seen in Africa, when soldiers are bored, they will either cause mischief or intervene in politics, i.e. coups. On the other hand, building up the military increases authoritarian rule over the population through justifications of protection and national security. Through these means, the ruler consolidates his power base and represses the opposition.

The build up of security forces is paid for either from government revenue or foreign aid. Government revenue comes from exports, and as aforementioned, if a state has a giant resource base then money for the security forces would be generated from this, such as oil in Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria, and diamonds in Zimbabwe. Usually the only other feasible form of government revenue comes from taxes, which are supposed to be utilized for infrastructure and state and social services. But if a government cannot tax efficiently, then not only will it not maximize its revenue intake but will also overburden a portion of the population, which in the case potential failed states is usually the peasant and poor classes. And rather than the tax money collected going to development and social services, it will go to the pockets of corrupt elites. Additionally, if a tax administration is corrupt as well, it will let the wealthy groups, who would pay larger taxes, circumvent tax laws with bribes. For example, in Nigeria wealthy group interests prevailed, whereby they paid off tax collectors or threatened blackmail.

When the main objectives of a ruler are to hold onto power and become rich, the outlook of a state effectively developing its political and economic sector becomes weak. One party rule is enacted and if elections are to occur, they will be unfair and corrupt. Throughout most of Africa, the right to self determination of government ended, therefore opposition movements were largely repressed, helping autocrats sustain power. The military is the only real worry, who can efficiently execute a coup d’état and overthrow its government due to political insufficiency as was seen in Uganda, Rwanda, Ghana, and Nigeria, among others. And although the new military-run government promises the people change, in essence the change of leadership exhibits the same structure and form of repressive governing that originally took place.