Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa

I was able to attend a conference on the challenges and opportunities for conflict prevention in Africa. Taye-Brook Zerihoun, the UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Professor Muna Ndulo, Law Professor at Cornell University were the two main presenters at this conference. Both understand the role of history in the security situation in Africa and see it as significant but not as bad as it was in the 1990s or early 2000s.

Zerihoun's believes Africa's security crisis stems from colonialism and the drawing up of the borders by those European colonizers. From this history, African rulers consolidate power because this is their memory of rulers when they were young. Although there may be elections in African states, it is usually winner-takes-all, with no tyranny of democracy in place (Tyranny of democracy means that the loser in elections is fine with losing and does not contest the elections). The borders have exacerbated ethnic rivalries because tribes and resources have been split up between countries, rendering it harder for leaders to create a national identity or utilize their resources effectively for the entire population. This is also due to corruption and greed on the part of African rulers, but this is the way power is exercised in Africa. There is no transparency in the government nor is there recourse for opposition parties to express themselves. Any peaceful methods of replacing leaders are not accepted and often ignored in Africa. A case in point is the recent "election" in Cote d'Ivoire.

Zerihoun also blames international organizations, including the UN for faulty peace keeping operations and believes that the African Union and the UN need more of an equal relationship, whereas the UN will be seen as a more legitimate institution in African affairs. As the African Union lacks political will to carry the burden of peace and security in Africa, the AU and UN need to work together to combat the security problems within Africa. Specifically with elections in Africa, as they are a significant source of conflict and if there is UN presence (rather than just other African observers) during elections, then the process may be seen as more free and fair.

Ndulo came out stating that there are 4 causes of conflict in Africa: 1) authoritarian rule 2) exclusion of minorities from government 3) social/economic dilapidation 4) weak state structures. There needs to be a focus on democratic values in Africa, which will help resolve these sources of conflict. States (read 'ones in power') accumulate wealth and redistribute this wealth to cronies and family members. Money is not utilized for infrastructure projects, economic or social development. Thus to gain relief, the mechanisms of government need to be recreated, so that corruption and nepotism are stamped out. Further, government must be inclusive, protect the rights of its constituents, and understand that conflict is present in society and try to find ways to alleviate it. Particularly with the issue of gender, all Africans need to see the role of women not just as an inclusion to society but see it as a broadening and the transforming of African policy, ideology, and institutions. African society itself must be given more outlets for participation, which in turn should bring effective change to the security situation. When the pressure and emphasis is put on leaders to create change and hence, peace, they tend to hold the situation hostage, trying to gain something for themselves rather than gain something for the entire country.

These were the main recommendations presented by Zerihoun and Ndulo. Of course the real problem is the actual implementation of these recommendations. Implementation will only occur with a cultural shift in governance and leadership in Africa (many have said this). But how to bring this shift about remains to be seen. Education is not enough, because in many African countries, the state is the main employer and corruption is the name of the game. It does not pay to be an honest politician in a corrupt political system because it is a lose-lose outcome for the honest guy. All other politicians come out ahead because they work the system to their advantage, leaving those few honest politicians to whither away as they cannot push through any of their projects due to a lack of political will power on the part of the government as a whole. Yet these honest politicians are needed in Africa, they are the ones that can begin to shift the political paradigm toward a more democratic system. It is just that these politicians need to unite and secure backing by the international community, who would need to turn away from their economic interests and support social/political change. Of course, this is easier said than done.

Militarized aid or no aid?

In an interesting article on Foreign Affairs, Michael Young writes about the inefficiencies of humanitarian aid distributed via military or security firms in his piece entitled "Development at Gunpoint." He calls this "militarized aid." Young makes the case for aid being distributed solely by NGOs or organizations unrelated to the military because in this way the organization can be impartial to those it serves and those it serves will not be seen as a collaborator with the the 'enemy' force. Further he says that militarized aid damages the stabilization effort in the area. Militarized aid is nothing new; the US military has been known for giving out food and water to effected populations during wartime activities. But militarized aid is new in this concept, because it encompasses activities more than distributing food and water, but rebuilding towns and communities.

The question to be asked is whether aid should be administered no matter what or by who or if it should only be administered if it is not un-stabilizing. In short, is aid from a military better than no aid? I believe that aid from anyone is better than no aid at all, even if aid comes from an extremist group, because although there may be propaganda tied to to the service, at least an effected population is getting help. Young says that there should be a civilian space that is more receptive to unbiased aid. This is true, and if safe havens could be established, like those set up in Sri Lanka and Bosnia during wars in the 1990s, then this discussion would be over. But safe havens are not always feasible, in fact, most of the time they are not. For instance, Somalia could benefit from a safe haven but there is no conceivable way a safe, impartial, civilian space could be created due to the large presence of al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. The current wars are more dangerous than those previous, and the civilian space with NGOs do not really exist anymore.

Moreover the community may be targeted either way, if they receive aid from a military service or from an unrelated organization. If it comes down to security, then a military or security service are probably the best service providers. The military is trained in security, one cannot always count them as inefficient aid providers. Militaries are usually better prepared and better equipped to deal with disasters or to operate in war zones. However if the warring factions can guarantee security to a given aid group, then it would be more practical for a regular aid agency to do business.

Another problem with aid in general is that it has the ability to find its way to the government of the country that requires aid. I agree with Young on this point. This is undoubtedly a problem, and yes, resources that end up in government coffers are more likely to come from another government agency than an NGO. The money that is given to the government is needed for the civilian population, but most of that money never makes it to the public. Sometimes governments can distribute money and resources through the NGO rather than the country's government, such as the US government funding the National Democratic Institute (although this is not an aid agency).

With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the forefront of aid necessity, security agencies may be better off to administer to affected populations, but to care for this population effectively is probably best put in the hands of NGOs and organizations unrelated to the security apparatus. Aid agencies are in it for the long haul as opposed to militaries which are bound to move on to the next location as their main goal is to win the conflict at hand (Young did not neglect this argument). But if getting aid to the needy is the primary goal, then it should not matter from whom it is from, what depends is the length of time that the affected population will need aid. Short-term would be sufficient for a military or security agency, long-term would better be situated for an NGO.

Part II: World on Fire Meets Wars, Guns, and Votes

In conjunction with the previous post, below is the rest of commentary for the questions:

Both Amy Chua in World on Fire and Paul Collier in Wars, Guns, and Votes, are critical of the way that the developed world has tried to build democracies in failed and fragile states. How do their opinions agree, how do they differ and how do their prescriptions mesh with the optimism of Larry Diamond in his book Spirit of Democracy?

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So what are Chua’s and Collier’s solutions to the problems of implementing democracy in the developing world? What both suggest is to level the playing field for the poor populations in the face of the market dominant minorities and the corrupt politicians. The economic and political benefits of the ruling minority need to be spread evenly across the population, such as through income redistribution and welfare systems. But to get to a more level playing field, both Chua and Collier have their own versions on how to accomplish this feat.

Chua suggests that countries with MDMs need to utilize domestic government intervention in order to create policies that spread economic and political benefits to the population. Policies could include affirmative action programs and ethnic quotas in corporations and universities, such as was seen from Malaysia’s New Economic Policy in the 1970s. Domestic governments can also encourage (or force) MDMs to voluntarily contribute to society, including donating money for education reform, infrastructure, hospitals. This policy has had success with Indians in Kenya, who have helped create the University of Nairobi and have expanded employee benefits to include free healthcare and even corporate housing. Voluntary contributions will help the MDM’s public reputation and show that they work for the good of the public interest. In addition, Chua calls on Western governments to change foreign policy and stop propping up dictators based on economic and national security interests. The West needs to promote full-fledge democracy, not just elections, and remain supportive of these countries in their long transition to democracy, regardless of the interests the West has at stake.

Collier takes Chua’s argument a step further and advocates direct intervention from the West to implement democracy. (Chua never calls for direct intervention.) A military intervention can contain political violence in a country, at the same time promoting stability through security and accountability of government. In short, the West’s intervention in the bottom billion will establish democratic principles in the political system that would guarantee accountability and security. Collier is skeptical that democracy would not flourish otherwise, especially for those small, multiple identity countries which lack the political will to provide services to its citizens. These countries could create regional partnerships and cooperatives to lessen their economic burdens by pooling their resources, but this leads to disputes over who owns what and how profits are divided when combining resources. Therefore the West needs to step in to help the bottom billion reform to achieve economic prosperity. This can only be done through having accountable governments who provide security for their citizens.

What the intervention system would aim to accomplish is to educate politicians on how, in a democratic society, to acquire power and spend public money. How this intervention system would work is as follows: Bottom billion countries can opt-in to the system of intervention, thereby not imposing democracy on any country and dispelling any accusations of colonialism. The international community will commit to those countries entered in the pact that should a coup d’état occur, intervention will take place to restore the rightful government. This pact between the international community and governments oversees and guards the electoral process. By safeguarding the elected government, these politicians would be encouraged to build accountability with the public through their spending measures. Bottom billion countries subsidize 1/3 of their expenditures with foreign monetary aid; thus donors would put pressure on these governments to spend the money on economic development schemes as well as be transparent in their spending. Donors could also link their monetary contributions to the level of military spending, where for every dollar a country foregoes spending on the military, they would be rewarded financially. In sum, the international community would be the gatekeeper of the bottom billion in hopes that elections would become violence-free, military spending would be cut, and politicians would become accountable.

In comparison to Larry Diamond’s optimism of the flourishing of democracy world wide in Spirit of Democracy, both Chua and Collier have more sobering assessments of democracy and its progression. Where Diamond appreciates little successes as a step in the right direction, Chua and Collier believe that any previous democratic measure implemented in the developing world should not be counted as success because it has brought about violence. Systematic change is needed for any democratic development. Granted Diamond does not argue that those democratic measures present in the developing world equals success, but democracy and accountability can grow from them. Chua and Diamond are also in favor that a stronger, more accountable democracy can be built on what these countries already have, where Collier is more inclined to believe that because these are farce democracies, international intervention will help countries start anew. But all three authors agree that democracy will not be implemented overnight nor will it do so under a façade of democratic institutions. Democracy and its values, including fair rule of law, popular sovereignty, and leadership accountability can only be implemented and sustained through the right policies and external help.

To sustain the pro-democracy attitude of the developing world that Diamond references, Chua’s prescriptions to change government internally and have the West foment state-building via foreign policy are more inclined to do so. Her mechanisms of change, such as creating affirmative action programs, MDM contribution programs, and giving the population a stake in the economy, are more feasible for the success of democracy as the changes come from within. Suggesting the West alter foreign policy to be more consistent and democratic as a way to equally encourage all countries to go through the transition is also in line with Diamond’s philosophy. Collier’s call for intervention by the international community does not fall within Diamond’s own arsenal for democratic promotion; nevertheless its goal to bring accountability and security to the bottom billion optimizes the potential for democratic development. Specifically with peacekeeping, Collier has found that it reduces violence in post-conflict situations, which is a positive aspect for his initiative of intervention but also stabilizes a country fresh out of conflict.

Chua’s and Collier’s solutions are not similar, but the goal is similar – promote, implement, and sustain democracy. They appear to be cautiously optimistic that if their solutions are implemented, democracy would begin to flourish in the developing world. It would be gradual and incremental change, but so long there is improvement for the majority, then real progress will be made. Diamond would agree. The three authors are aware that elections do not equate to democracy and that no matter what improvements are made politically, there is no guarantee in eradicating poor practices, such as repressing freedom of speech or instigating nationalist movements against a minority. States that encompass the latter and do not follow the standards of Western democracy are not legitimate democratic governments, but usually ones who are corrupt, greedy, and power hungry. Throughout many countries of the developing world, honest and effective leadership is uncommon. Help is needed from the outside world, be it through foreign policy initiatives or intervention, to get the bottom billion on the right track to democracy.

Part I: World on Fire Meets Wars, Guns, and Votes

The following two posts will address the following question:

Both Amy Chua in World on Fire and Paul Collier in Wars, Guns, and Votes, are critical of the way that the developed world has tried to build democracies in failed and fragile states. How do their opinions agree, how do they differ and how do their prescriptions mesh with the optimism of Larry Diamond in his book Spirit of Democracy?

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From what one can gather if one read’s both Amy Chua’s World on Fire and Paul Collier’s Wars, Guns, and Votes is that if one does not either live in the developed, democratic Western world, or is not a rich elite in a the developing world, then one will lead a difficult life. Globalization helps spread democracy around the world, but the democracy that many countries implement is not the quintessential Western democracy. In fact the democracy that the developing world employs is one that benefits those in power, politically and economically, and does little to enhance the lives of the average citizens. The problem is practical, and in a way, definitional. Developing country elites want to implement enough democratic measures, such as multi-party elections, to keep receiving money from donors but at the same time tend to redefine democracy to fit their own needs. Chua and Collier both agree that democracy must represent more than elections or majority rule. The liberty and equality which is inscribed in Western democracy must also flourish in the developing world.

Chua’s and Collier’s arguments have many commonalities but also differ in certain regards. The main difference is that Chua argues from a market-based perspective, underlining how market dominant minority ethnic groups hold all the economic power in many developing countries. The insistence of democracy in these countries has not led to a freer competition; rather it has led to violence and greed. Collier’s argument is more political, focusing on the violence that occurs in his ‘bottom billion’ because 1) democratic values are not instituted and 2) the economies of these countries are weak. They both offer solutions for these problems: Chua opts on the side of internal democratic change where Collier is a proponent of external intervention to achieve change.

What Chua aims to set straight is that democracy is not a cure-all for ethnic and political violence around the world, but that democracy is a catalyst of violence, especially in the developing world. Western-style democracy, which is supported and encouraged around the world by America and Europe, hold high the effects of political liberalization, elections, and the empowerment of civil society. Hence the West will donate money to developing countries that embrace these principles of democracy as well as open up their markets to free competition. However Chua points out problems that are caused by both democracy and free markets – two things the West believe go hand in hand. The implementation of “free” markets and democracy has helped many market-dominant minorities take economic and political control of the countries in which they reside. The market dominant minority (MDM) is a small ethnic group that controls most of a country’s economy through their financial transactions and holdings. For example, the Chinese in the Philippines control over 90% of the economy and Indians disproportionately run the Kenyan economy – although the Kikuyu tribe has had success as well. In instances such as these, the pursuit of democracy has not led to country-wide prosperity and peace. What tend to result are three scenarios: backlash against the markets and the MDM’s financial holdings; reversal of democracy at the expense of the majority population or MDM, or; violence directed against the MDM.

The situation in Zimbabwe encompasses all three scenarios. Colonial Zimbabwe saw the British become the prosperous outsider group, overtaking the majority of arable farm land and capitalizing on agricultural trade. Since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, democracy was ushered in with the first free elections crowning Robert Mugabe president. Many Englishmen, the market dominant minority, stayed in the country and have retained ownership of the commercial farming land and larger agricultural market for generations. Although Mugabe ran on the nationalistic platform of “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans” and promises to nationalize and redistribute white farmland, he held off on his promises due to IMF austerity plans. These “belt tightening, free market” (pg. 130) plans only made the economic situation worse for the poor black Zimbabweans. As a result, Mugabe’s political influence began to wane, thus reverting to his call to seize white farmland and redistribute it to the poor black majority. Since the early 2000s, Mugabe has enacted this nationalization policy, which has altered the market-based economy toward socialism and more importantly, has led to a decrease in commercial farming production. This policy has also encouraged and led to violent attacks against white farmers and their land. Mobs would descend onto a farm, pillage property, kill livestock, and set the house on fire.

Consequently, the white landowners have financially backed the opposition political party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) since the 2000 elections. They are hoping to ensure constitutional changes that protect minorities and their surrounding property in Zimbabwe. But each election since 2000, Mugabe has run on the nationalist platform and there have been cases of corruption, ballot-stuffing, and intimidation by Mugabe’s Zanu PF party. The MDC has won seats in the parliament and has also obtained a power-sharing deal between Robert Mugabe and MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai. However this deal has been skewed in favor of Mugabe by Mugabe himself, confirming the backlash against democracy as Mugabe’s grip on power has not been loosened.

Chua emphasizes the fact that democratic elections and political liberalizations are seen as a vent for frustrations for the poor majority, many times calling for physical violence and deportation of the market dominant minority. Besides Mugabe in Zimbabwe, other examples include the fierce, nationalistic rhetoric of the Serbs in the Former Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic (“Serbia for Serbs”) and the genocide of the politically powerful minority Tutsi by the Hutus in Rwanda in 1994. The implementation of democracy does not automatically create rational citizens; if they are disadvantaged on account of an MDM they can be easily swayed to support the ‘demagogue’ who demonizes the MDM. In short, the demagogue will create an ethno-nationalist movement with the sole goal of taking back the wealth and dominance of the MDM for the poor majority.

In addition, MDMs can be in cahoots with the dictators or presidents and participate in crony capitalism. A prime example is Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos of the Philippines in the 1970s, who extorted money from the ethnic Chinese business class in return for access to resources and business contracts. The economic success of these MDMs and the access to the resources and wealth of their respective countries has only produced hatred and resentment from the ethnic poor majority, as shown above. This is the main reason why if democracy were to come about in the developing world, constitutional measures to protect the minorities and their property must be instituted. If not, it may encourage MDM’s to leave the country and take their capital with them.

Collier agrees that democracy and free markets do not necessarily bring about free, fair, and prosperous societies. His research shows that although democracy can reduce political violence, it depends on the economic level of the country. For instance, in middle income countries, political violence is reduced by democracy, but in countries with low incomes, democracy has enhanced political violence. Chua’s Zimbabwe example speaks to this effect that in poor countries with a median or lower income of $2,700 (pg. 22), democracy does not alleviate the dangers that already exist. However unlike Chua, who focuses on the surrounding political and economic situation of market dominant minorities in their respective countries, Collier tries to explain and generalize why democracy enhances political violence in poor countries. What he finds is that democracy in these countries does not generate freedom of the press nor the infrastructure to pass on information, such as electricity and roads. Rather knowledge is scarce and information on leaders is very biased. Therefore the electorate bases their vote on three scenarios. Firstly, the electorate will vote based on the actions of the president and how they were affected by his/her policies. Secondly, identity politics can be utilized where ethnic groups or tribes vote for those politicians who are of the same background. Lastly, the electorate is co-opted, bribed, or intimidated not to vote. Hence if democracy only means elections, true democratic reform will never happen.

Further, Collier focuses his attention on the lack of political accountability, specifically checks and balances, and security that prohibit the spread of democracy in his ‘bottom billion’ countries. However Collier’s main concerns are similar to Chua’s backlash against democracy scenario. Regarding accountability, in corrupt political environments, and corrupt societies as a whole, those moral citizens who seek to be elected realize that morality will not win over corruptness. Therefore either the potential, moral politician decides not to run or if he does run, there is good chance he too may become corrupt in order to survive the political game. Naturally the problem with corrupt politicians is that they are the ones that hold the country’s future and ultimately make the decisions in developing the state democratically. And because there is no checks and balance system, politicians do as they please and trust is lost between them and their constituents. Trust is also weaker between ethnic groups. For example, in Kenya diversity of tribes does not give the country a vibrant democracy as compared with the diversity of America; rather diversity has hindered economic growth as voting is usually along ethnic lines, regardless of performance of politicians. A system of checks and balances would help keep politics impartial in Kenya to the benefit of society, such as is seen in Belgium and Canada.

Security is the other factor that is needed to stabilize countries and advance democracy. What Collier reports is that the size of the country defines the potential for violence. Larger countries tend to be safer and smaller countries tend to be more violent because security is based on economies of scale. Smaller countries usually have fewer resources, less access to wealth, and less space for political participation, so these countries need to spend more than large countries on their security apparatus to keep the country from civil strife. In addition, if these small countries are extremely poor, such as the bottom billion, military spending is higher because violence is more likely due to limited economic opportunities. Particularly in post-conflict societies, military spending is increased in preparation for more war and paying for this security diverts funds from other forms of economic development. In bottom billion countries, 40% of aid money is spent on the military, which hampers societal development and steals money needed to improve living standards. Collier points out that even with high military spending, violence is not always quelled; it also enhances repression of political opponents, going against any democratic principles. In sum, stabilization and development do not come with guns, especially for small, poor countries that need to create economic opportunities for its population.

Both Collier and Chua explain that democratic development in the developing world tends to obstruct economic and governmental reform rather than support reform. Holding elections without enforcing the rules and crony capitalism do no good in ethnically divided societies. Subsequently, democratic development is not in the interest of the politicians, as they will lose their power and access to wealth as democracy expands. Those democratic measures that are already implemented are not beneficial to everyone in the country, usually putting the market dominant minorities and politicians in a position to gain more access to markets and wealth. As they are the ones in power, they can manipulate democracy to their advantage or do just do away with it, bringing about authoritarian states. For example, Collier lists seven potential options that a president can take during campaign season. Only one option is moral and falls across democratic lines: that is to run a free and fair election. The other six options detail how a president can retain power undemocratically. Collier also asserts that accountability is impeded by a lack of a collective, national identity in each country and the lax tax burden on citizens, which has not reached levels where citizens demand accountability of their leaders.

AMISOM in Somalia

Somalia is consistently ranked the #1 failed state in the world by Foreign Policy and most news reporters label it the most dangerous place in the world (not to mention K'naan loves to rap about how Mogadishu is ueber-gangster). Without going into the history of Somalia's ongoing civil strife, warlordism, and terrorism, this is what is happening currently in a nut shell: The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a force comprised of around 7-8,000 troops (any news paper article will have a different number of troops and the AMISOM's two websites do not list the exact figure) from Uganda and Burundi that are mandated to protect the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as well as the Somali population around the capital city Mogadishu. For the most part, AMISOM is fighting the extremist group based on Islam, Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (better known as al Shabaab or 'the youth'). But AMISOM also fights Hizbul-Islam, another insurgent group that may come into cahoots with al Shabaab. The main problem with AMISOM is that this military is only making minimal progress against al Shabaab and only controls a few blocks around the capital, mainly where the government buildings and airport are located. Though, at times, this minimal progress concerns al Shabaab, who are now paying foreign recruits $250 a month, $50 more than domestic recruits, to fight with Shabaab against AMISOM.

From reports and interviews given by AMISOM commanders, this military is underfunded, undermanned, and under-supplied. Undermanned is the most accurate complaint as it has taken 3 years from AMISOM's inception in 2007 to finally accumulate a number of troops close to the 8,000 that is was originally mandated. This past summer, Uganda has called for supplying up to 20,000 soldiers altogether, but that it and Burundi cannot be the only countries to supply these troops. Actually Uganda said that if the US will support them, they will ready themselves to send another 10,000 troops to Somalia. The US, through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, have remained ambiguous about the US contributing directly to this 10K increment, but still insist that the US will keep supporting AMISOM and the TFG financially and diplomatically. (As a side note, the US does not want to get involved with Somalia because it cannot handle spreading its troops even wider across the world. Additionally there are 2 other wars the US needs to focus on). The total money spent on AMISOM between America and the European Union is between $400-500 million. I am not a military financial expert, but with this type of money received for the past 3 years, it would seem that more progress would have been made in Somalia. But alas, money does not equal the will to fight, and fight effectively.

AMISOM is directly concerned with "peace" on the ground in Mogadishu, but has played a minor role in fighting piracy in conjunction with the EU's Operation Atalanta. There boats aren't the greatest ships out there, basically a narrow boat that can carry approximately 6 men with a motor on one side and a machine gun on the other. But at least there is a presence, albeit small, and Ugandans are training the Somali military with this equipment, in this regard. In fact, AMISOM is training the newly developed Somali army and police forces in Mogadishu. With the help of France, Italy, Dyncorp, and Burundi, training military training is taking place for Somali security forces. News articles and interviews suggest that it will be years before the Somali military can successfully take over the AMISOM mandate. There are other accounts of Shabaab infiltrations, desertions, and death threats. It remains to be seen how things will play out for AMISOM in Somalia, as well as the Somali security forces, but it does not look as hopeful as all thought it would be when AMISOM was first commissioned in 2007.

This is the second part of the paper, discussing Algeria's road to state failure. This is not implying that Algeria is a failed state, but that is exhibits those factors of a failed state discussed in the previous post.

Algeria is a unique case as it experienced a violent struggle for independence, underwent a long period of calm and economic progress, opened its doors to democracy, but remains a military autocracy. After the civil war with France for independence in the 1950s, the new post-colonial government led by Ben Bella and the National Liberation Front (FLN) could not use the newfound Algerian nationalism to its advantage as the FLN splintered due to arguments of who and how the country should be run. Like most post-colonial governments the FLN ran a (Islamic) socialist campaign with policies intended to lift the poor out of poverty and into a modern state. During Ben Bella’s reign, no social and economic services were provided because there was no political will to deliver the services. What happened in Algeria next is much like what has happened to many other African countries on the verge of failure, the military stepped in and consolidated political power within its own institution. In 1965, a military coup led by Boumedienne ended Ben Bella’s reign and assumed the political, economic, and social problems inherited from the civil war. Boumedienne presided over Algeria under the FLN banner as well because only one-party rule was allowed at the time.

Boumedienne’s presidency until the late 1970s exhibited a relative peace and successful economic development. He developed Algeria through industrialization, specifically though oil and gas exports that garnered economic growth, moving Algeria through the ranks of other African countries to becoming a modern, industrialized state. Boumedienne successfully turned Algeria around from the political, social, and economic demise that came under Ben Bella’s regime. But when Boumedienne died in the late 1970s during the oil crisis, Algeria again began to slump economically, losing revenue on oil while experiencing high unemployment and inflation. There were also food shortages and cuts in electricity and water, which does not make for a happy population.

Unfortunately for the Algerian citizens, all this turmoil could not just be blamed on the faltering economy. The new military and FLN leader, Chadli Benjedid took over after Boumedienne’s death and decided that economic and political reform was needed to get out of Algeria’s crisis. The reforms did not have the intended outcomes, and actually led to governmental corruption, a large dependence on oil, and a growing foreign debt that needed to be repaid. Algerian citizens were growing largely frustrated with the inefficiency of the FLN, and this culminated in the 1988 work strikes and food riots. The FLN called in the army to restore order, and they killed and tortured thousands of Algerians, which further delegitimized the government in eyes of public. What resulted was an appeasement of the public by the FLN, who instituted multi-party elections in 1991, with the belief that they would win regardless. To the detriment of the FLN, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an opposition political party won the first round of elections due to large scale disdain for the FLN. As background, FIS is an Islamic political party that wants to do away with all things Western in Algerian society, specifically democracy, and runs on a platform of social justice and creation of jobs. FIS was barred from the second round of elections as the military again stepped in and ensured the FLN remained in power. The military eventually banned all political parties based on religion in March 1997.

This move to ban the FIS from running resulted in another civil war that claimed close to 150,000 Algerian lives and also deposed the incumbent president Benjedid. Yet some democratic processes remained intact after the canceled elections of 1991, namely the multiparty political system and freedom of the press. Throughout the 1990s, the military held support from a portion of the population who were suspicious of the FIS and their Islamic outlook, yet still partook in a policy of repression and violence when necessary in Algeria. Needless to say, throughout most of Algeria’s post-colonial history, the military and state-security services have been the arbiters of power in Algeria and backed all presidential candidates that won elections in the 1990s, some which were FLN military leaders. The military was able to consolidate political power unto itself because it was the one institution in Algerian society that did not crumble due to poor economic strategy and social disorder; in fact the military cashed in on the oil wealth, using this money to pay its soldiers as well as pay rents to other actors willing to accept military direction. Lastly, the Algerian military, like many other African militaries in power, used the threat of internal disorder to strengthen its power grip on society.

According to Ayittey, a dispute over the electoral process and a resulting military intervention is usually the first steps to the destruction of a (African) country. The usual reason is because the military was unwilling to give up its power and wealth it took in from oil exports. The late 1990s up to recent times has actually seen the decrease of military control over the political system under the independent president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who himself was backed by the military when he first won presidency in 1999. He has amended the constitution so that there are no term limits for presidents, consolidated power away from the military, reaps the benefits of the export earnings of oil, and is becoming the ultimate autocrat. Although Bouteflicka tries to promote open elections, his election wins in 2004 and 2009 were not considered free and fair by opposition parties.

There may be little hope for Algeria that the UNDP’s assessment putting Algeria on the “brink of complete social disintegration” (Ayittey 13) will not become true. A 2004 survey in Algeria found that approximately 85% believe democracy is the best system of government for their country but also split on whether religion should influence political decisions. But this belief in democracy has not changed the political or economic system in Algeria. The government controls most of the economy and is weary of foreign direct investment. There is still government corruption pertaining to infrastructure and other development projects, high unemployment, and social upheaval regarding opposition terrorist factions attacking the government. Moreover there is a large amount of the population that lives in poverty and is awaiting the government to improve their living standards. What Algeria needs is to liberalize the economy to spur investment and development, which in turn would lead to social changes and perhaps a culture that resembled the Boumedienne era, which would then lead to a more efficient democracy.

Contributing Factors to Failed States

This is the another analytical paper that concentrates on the literature provided in Jeffrey Herbst's States and Power in Africa and George Ayittey's Africa in Chaos. The paper attempts to answer the following question:

"What factors contribute directly to the creation of failed states? What issues emanate in Algeria?"

This will be given in two parts, the first covers some of the more dominant factors of state failure and the second part will be on Algeria.

States fail, though not often, but it is more common for states to come to the verge of failure. Herbst and Ayittey expose the process and the comprising factors that lead to state failure, particularly in Africa. The process and factors are not the same in every country, but they follow a general pattern. It usually begins with countries that promise social and economic change for all but fall prey to authoritarianism, which leads to corruption and paranoia, which then leads to more corruption and repression of society. Underdevelopment, weak rule of law, lack of political will, lack of personal security, and exclusion of large portions of the population from wealth are some factors that exacerbate the road to state failure. Naturally states on this road can reverse their trend and progress on a path toward social, political, and economic stability, such as Rwanda, but it is not too often that this occurs. What is most common, as can be concluded by Herbst and Ayittey, is that a state remains stagnant, hoping to one day get out of its hole rather than sliding further into state failure (see Somalia).

Herbst depicts two factors that can bolster a state as well as induce a state to fail if not applied properly: costs of expanding a state and buffer mechanisms. A government wants to use a proper cost-benefit ratio to expand its power outward from the capital that uses the least amount of resources or existing institutions and infrastructure. If the government overpays in this regard, it will need to make up the money in another sector, such as exports or taxes. Any money sent to the countryside needs to be utilized efficiently, perhaps creating new infrastructure, markets, and thus towns or cities with local governments. If not, like in many countries in Africa, money for projects will be bribed or stolen away with an end result of delegitimizing the government as projects do not get completed. There is a need for strong control over fiscal and monetary policies, unlike government actions in Nigeria and Ghana, but there is also a need for the government to exert political will to galvanize the countryside and foment a nationalism that will support the government. If not, the government will be relegated to ruling only those cities and villages that contain government infrastructure in place and no patriotic ties between the government and the population will exist.

As a complement to the political will argument, boundaries as a buffer mechanism of a state that regulate the flow of goods and people into and out of the state. A leader of a state naturally wants control over the borders and therefore boundaries are securitized, especially due to possible invasion from external forces as well. If boundaries are not controlled there is no rule of law and chaos and illegal happenings will ensue. As Herbst points out, secure boundaries develop other institutions, such as currency exchange and citizenship rules. The hinterlands – the sparsely populated regions outside the capital – the people that inhabit these lands and the surrounding borders are important because to successfully rule a state, the tentacle of power must stretch from one side of the country to the next. If those in the hinterland are not affected by rule of law and in essence can act without abiding by laws that the ruler sets, then there is no control over these areas. The hinterlands need to be included to make a holistic state in order to create a nationalism that will legitimize the state and induce the citizens to support it through labor and money.

In other words, the problem of weak states is that power extends only from the capital city, rather than multiple cities throughout the country. To explain, it is what Herbst calls that “center-periphery divide” (pg 20), meaning that the land on the periphery of the capital (the center) is not relevant in the eyes of the authority. Granted Herbst thinks that the borders of all African states need to be redrawn as they were implemented by European colonialists, these states still failed to inspect their boundaries and what their territory encompassed to see what they could develop or fund. Furthermore, what many African as well as some Middle Eastern rulers forget was that one cannot assume that control of the capital equates to sovereignty over the entire country. There are a few problems with this governing approach that helps aid in country destruction. First, there are no local governments in other regions to act as an arm of the government. In Africa specifically, colonists did not leave local institutions intact, only state institutions; so there may be a few other cities and urban centers with local municipal governments, but the majority of the hinterlands are left without any federal governing institutions. With the projection of power concentrated from the capital and only extending to a few other cities, it is very hard to establish rule of law throughout the hinterlands, and hence gain political influence. Therefore coercion and co-optation of the local leaders and tribal chiefs was a way to dictate rule in these areas. Herbst states that through coercion any type of authority or authoritative presence can be displayed in the hinterlands.

Another problem of the center-periphery divide is that governments only develop the urban areas while providing goods, resources, infrastructure, markets, and state privileges. Particularly not assembling roads and other related infrastructure is a major hindrance to the projection of power and influence. If there are no efficient means to transport goods, commerce, and information, then citizens are at a loss for economic prosperity. The collapse of infrastructure and lack of investment causes states to fail by isolating those peoples and tribes in the hinterlands, thus delegitimizing the government. The center-periphery divide also encourages dense populations near the capital and other urban centers which are created by the migration of the hinterlands population to these areas. If there is no economic development throughout most of the country, then there are only a few places to look for employment. Further, if the only jobs available are government jobs, then the pull factor towards the capital is even stronger. A lack of development in the hinterlands, including minimal infrastructure will not unify the population. The only time African leaders try to mobilize the hinterlands are during election periods, which do not give one a very popular support base. Granted constructing infrastructure is costly and difficult, such as the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, efforts should be made to connect all regions of a country to stimulate economics and unity.

Lastly, but still in connection with the center-periphery divide, is the problem of governments exploiting natural resources and not distributing the wealth evenly throughout the country. This can be done in three ways: 1) the government elites pocket the money, 2) the money is not allocated to the region where the resource is located, and 3) the money is only allocated to the area where the resource is located. In some cases, such as with Sudan and Nigeria, the minority is settled in areas with abundant oil resources and want to reap the benefits of the resource, thus causing conflict with other regions who want a piece of the pie. In Sudan, there will now be a referendum for the south to leave the north, which is causing anxiety in the north as the south holds all the oil reserves and the money. The scenario in Nigeria is the opposite of Sudan, the oil from the southern province is tunneled to the north to be developed and distributed. The resulting money is kept in the north with no reinvestment in the south. Cases such as Nigeria cause political tensions that will eventually erupt into situations like Sudan, both being detrimental to state success.

As can be seen, it is ultimately the mismanagement of money that leads a state to failure. Ayittey demonstrates the strategy of elites in Africa who try to imitate the West and those elites who once ruled over African countries. By doing so, they spend money that the state does not have on useless and personal items, such as fancy cars and technological gadgets as well as on status symbols for the capital to make it stand out more like a Western capital city. A prime example to Ayittey’s argument is that of President Bokassa of the Central African Republic who paid $20 million of state money to crown himself emperor in 1976 just so Africa had an emperor. Lavish and unchecked spending by presidents and elites can only aid in the demise of a state. But unfortunately this is what tends to happen in countries controlled by power-hungry rulers. They see state revenue as their own wealth, spend it unproductively, and exploit it as though it will never dry up. The money source never comes from a bustling economy, which should be a key indicator that the state is not functioning at capacity, but nevertheless money came from sources such as rents and taxes, corruption/bribes, abundant resources/exports, or foreign aid (or a combination of these).

Collecting rents from in-country businesses and on exports can lead countries to collapse as the rent money is usually pocketed directly by a select few elites rather than being distributed evenly throughout the country. In short, the companies are paying the elites bribes to do business. In fact, Ayittey points out that rent-seeking in Africa is so bad that there is no opportunity for future rent-seeking rulers because the current leaders are milking every penny they can receive. Granted that rents are seen as corruption, there are still other massive amounts of corruption that can degrade the fiscal stability of a state, especially when the state is seen as the sole provider of jobs. The problem is that head of states use privileges and power for selfish reasons, such as ensuring they are paid handsomely for any government contract they hand out. These actions trickle down to all state employees, who may charge extra fees for transportation tickets or entrance to ministry buildings, such as was the case in Nigeria with its security personnel.

The resource curse occurs when states with abundant resources do not use the money efficiently or for democratic transition purposes. This is particularly true in many African countries, such as Sudan, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Nigeria. The money from resources is not spent on state-building projects, but on personal investment or internal security measures. Resource-less countries (and sometimes even resource abundant countries) seek economic solutions from external factors, specifically foreign aid money. The problem that comes with receiving aid money is that the government should use it toward some sort of development but does not do so. Rather corrupt governments see foreign aid as revenue, spending more than their collected revenue from taxes and exports. Further governments will focus less on economic inputs in the economy that would supplement the foreign aid as income because it is assumed that foreign will always be given. This reasoning ultimately leads to deficit spending, increasing debt for countries that lack the economic output for repayment. Overall, the mismanagement of monetary resources creates an environment in which productive economic inputs, such as industry, agriculture, and the service sector are shunned by greedy leaders to the detriment of the average citizen.

There is one other form of money mismanagement in which both Herbst and Ayittey focus, that of state security. Security, both external and internal, but specifically internal is a cost that become overpaid and overinvested, which then takes away resources that would otherwise be better allocated to areas of state-building and economic development. One the one hand, there will always be an external threat somewhere, but spending on security and defense should be proportionate to the potential threats, because as can be seen in Africa, when soldiers are bored, they will either cause mischief or intervene in politics, i.e. coups. On the other hand, building up the military increases authoritarian rule over the population through justifications of protection and national security. Through these means, the ruler consolidates his power base and represses the opposition.

The build up of security forces is paid for either from government revenue or foreign aid. Government revenue comes from exports, and as aforementioned, if a state has a giant resource base then money for the security forces would be generated from this, such as oil in Sudan, Nigeria, Algeria, and diamonds in Zimbabwe. Usually the only other feasible form of government revenue comes from taxes, which are supposed to be utilized for infrastructure and state and social services. But if a government cannot tax efficiently, then not only will it not maximize its revenue intake but will also overburden a portion of the population, which in the case potential failed states is usually the peasant and poor classes. And rather than the tax money collected going to development and social services, it will go to the pockets of corrupt elites. Additionally, if a tax administration is corrupt as well, it will let the wealthy groups, who would pay larger taxes, circumvent tax laws with bribes. For example, in Nigeria wealthy group interests prevailed, whereby they paid off tax collectors or threatened blackmail.

When the main objectives of a ruler are to hold onto power and become rich, the outlook of a state effectively developing its political and economic sector becomes weak. One party rule is enacted and if elections are to occur, they will be unfair and corrupt. Throughout most of Africa, the right to self determination of government ended, therefore opposition movements were largely repressed, helping autocrats sustain power. The military is the only real worry, who can efficiently execute a coup d’état and overthrow its government due to political insufficiency as was seen in Uganda, Rwanda, Ghana, and Nigeria, among others. And although the new military-run government promises the people change, in essence the change of leadership exhibits the same structure and form of repressive governing that originally took place.

Diamond's Democracy part II

This is the second of the previous post....

Internal factors are needed more to drive an authoritarian state into the ground, because if civil society is not on board with change, then change will not persist. Therefore, the civic community must begin to see all its members as equal and with the same opportunity to advance in life through education and employment. Pro-democratic change usually makes way for economic opportunities and the free flow of information, which leads to power into civilians hands to act out against the authoritarian regime. Taiwan is a great example when its per capita income increased by 7% starting in the 1960s while its economy grew by 9% annually, its transition to democracy went much smoother because the public benefitted. Another manner in which civil society becomes empowered and takes chances to oppose the ruling class is when the legitimacy of the government declines. Legitimacy can decline because the ruling party is not delivering on its goals to the public, such as was seen in the Philippines and Serbia, or if the government consumed all the state’s capital such as was the case of Benin in the late 1980s. In addition, when legitimacy declines, political elites jump ship, which also occurred in Benin, and may lead the opposition movement against the current dictator.

Diamond goes over each region of the world and describes the democracy prospects and the problems that confront democracy from expanding. Beginning with Eastern Europe, Diamond presents surveys taken in the mid-2000s that show most East and Central Europeans are increasingly against authoritarian regimes and one party rule. Yet some post-Soviet states, like Ukraine and Belarus, reveal that they are more open to authoritarianism, like Ukraine and Belarus. Further, right wing parties and populist movements have been springing up in the 2000s, such as the National Union Attack Party in Bulgaria, which hinder democratic achievements. One party rule has the tendency to bounce back in Eastern Europe due to overwhelming corruption and political infighting, thus democratic parties need to remain on the scene to counterbalance populism. There is also distrust of political institutions since communism, socialism, and authoritarianism did not vanish long ago. Lastly, and although the EU structural programs are aimed to usher in democracy, politically weak countries like Serbia, Macedonia, and Kosovo find it hard to live up to the EU standards of liberalism and human rights and much progress and encouragement is needed to keep countries on the democratic path.

Latin America is stricken with poverty, social exclusion, and mass inequality in most states but more so in Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Although elections tend to get high turnouts, basic citizenship rights are lacking and corruption is rampant. Organized crime is an issue as well as crooked cops who accept bribes and will not put their lives in danger. This can be seen in states like Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and Guatemala. Diamond, again through surveys on attitudes toward democracy, shows that Latin Americans are in support of and ready for democracy, but still do not overtly trust their leaders. Moreover, they are aware that inequality and corruption hurt the status of the state. In short, a weak rule of law, a lot crime in the poorer parts of society, and strong organized crime puts democracy on the back burner. Perhaps living in a democratic state would help reduce these ailments in society, but when looking at Mexico, this does not appear to be so.

Asia has a variety of political systems with two of the best emerging democracies in Taiwan and South Korea, according to Diamond. He is also enthusiastic about India’s democracy as it is the most populous democracy in the world. However, democracy is under stress in the region, specifically in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Thailand where the military rules the land. The region lacks proper and just leaders, ones that will provide for the economy while fighting greed and corruption. Further, Singapore’s model is a counter to democracy, which has an authoritarian style government but has provided economically and financially for its citizens. Therefore other states in the region can point to Singapore as support for one party-rule rather than trying democracy. There is also Taiwan’s Chen Shui-bian, who aimed to hold onto power in 2004, and by doing so reverted to spying on civilians and detaining certain opposition members. He singlehandedly set democracy back in the country, especially when it was reported that Chen’s son and wife were feeding off Taiwan’s monetary capital. A positive result to this fiasco in Taiwan was that its citizens demonstrated and demanded accountability, exercising their democratic rights (Chen was eventually reelected in 2004). But because democracy is emerging in Asia such as in Eastern Europe, one party rule and power-hungry leaders are still a possibility.

In Africa, first and foremost there is the resource curse where an abundance of a resource, such as oil and diamonds, should make the entire country wealthy but the money ends up finding its way to the pockets of the ruling class. Nigeria is a prime example of this, where the late president and leader of the People’s Democratic Party Umaru Yar'Adua corrupted the country by consuming the oil wealth. Yar'Adua exhibits what Diamond calls personal rule, which is basically authoritarian rule but for personal gain and pleasure. Personal rule is when citizens are dependent on politicians for their needs, and thus bribery and corruption flow easily and money trickles up to the ruler this way. Many countries in Africa have presidents that engage in this form of rule, and trying to convince these heads of states that democracy is a better system is a battle. Moreover, these personal rulers can also live off of international monetary and material aid, which according to Diamond is the biggest inhibitor of democracy in Africa. Uganda political leaders led by Museveni have blatantly stolen aid money, committed bribes and blackmailed too. In essence these are the duties of personal rule. Yet all this corruption and money grabbing can lead to civil violence as citizens rise up against the rulers but are oppressed in doing so because civil liberties are not free generally in Africa. It is also difficult to campaign without threats, injury and surveillance, and thus hard to get dictators out of power and change the political system and economy.

Lastly is the Middle East, which exhibits all the same inhibitors of democracy that Africa does, but to a different extent because of Islamic law and religiosity. Extreme political Islam and sharia law oppose democratic values because human rights are not entirely respected in the law code. More importantly, it is hard to debate or fight against religious law in court, because it is divine and knows no wrong. Also, monarchies and family rule prohibit others from leading countries that have been ruled by the same family for generations like in Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. And for this reason, I believe that the Middle East will be the most difficult moving towards democracy. Many countries sustain itself on their vast oil wealth, but with little other economic opportunities and high poverty rates, when the oil runs out the situation will turn ugly. It is not to say that a democratic Middle East will alleviate the economic situation, but as long as oil is in the ground, there will be power hungry rulers. The ruling parties of the country have not changed much over the years and the situation does not look to be any better in the future. Ruling parties are holding on because there is nothing else available in the region. Islam is a factor too, but this will be explained in the next section. There is also extremist views of the West in the general public, which will not foster democratic change because it is a ‘Western system.” In sum, the Middle East will have the furthest to go in transitioning to democracy and getting its act together to give the residents of the region more opportunity.

In conjunction with the Middle East, the debate about whether Islam is compatible with democracy must be noted. According to an attitudinal survey on democracy and interviews with political scientists, Diamond shows that many citizens from Islamic societies agree with democratic principles and view democracy as a good, legitimate governmental system. But at the same time, many respondents also view Islam and democracy as co-existing, rather than separating the two as in the United States. It is unclear if Islam and democracy are compatible if they are not separated; but just being a Muslim is not incompatible with living under or wanting to live under a democracy. Political Islam exists, but when it is taken to extreme like the way the Muslim Brotherhood and Zawahiri utilize political Islam, then the principles of Islam conflict with those of democracy. Moreover, Islam law (sharia) would take priority over democracy, rendering democracy void. For example, Iran and Saudi Arabia both follow forms of sharia law and are not democratic. But pressure from the West is beginning to open up Saudi Arabia to democratic values and Iran is perhaps not the best indicator of the future. Perhaps Jordan, Lebanon, or Morocco (who has underwent political reforms and has multiparty system but still remains a repressive regime), are better indicators of Islam and democracy as all three countries have experienced bits of democratic change.

Although voting does not solidify a country as democratic, it seems when countries in the Middle East are able to vote, Islamic based parties do well (but are then repressed). Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood have a track record of this. Diamond does not see this as threatening to democracy, rather Islamic political parties must define their platform and be tolerant of those who may not follow their party, as well as be tolerant of potential laws that fall outside of sharia. Diamond believes that to gain democracy in the Middle East and other Muslim-dominated countries, Islam will inevitably be part of the political spectrum. Thus there must be a balance between democracy and Islam that will appeal to the general public in solidifying democracy while incorporating Islam.

Usually when one thinks about democracy America comes to mind. It was the model of democracy and it tried to export this model around the world, but recently America itself has been experiencing problems, rendering its democratic political system weak. First, participation in voting as well as working and volunteering for political causes has declined since the 1970s. It appears America’s youth is not as politically active as it once was, where campus demonstrations against war and the government were not uncommon. On the plus side, political activism was up during President Obama’s campaign, but Diamond’s book was published before this event. Second, lobbying politicians to pass bills that aid certain industries is not entirely democratic. Granted one has the right to push for the most s/he can get, lobbying takes this to the next step because some times politicians may be bribed by these platforms.

As aforementioned, lobbying can lead to corruption, which is the third aspect of America’s weak democracy. Although it is impossible to completely stamp corruption out, America has its share of illegal transactions. Diamond points out that the Department of Justice charges 100 state officials each year with corruption. Of course corruption can be caused by a number of factors, but campaign financing, in relation to lobbying, is large source. Politicians will write things off on their campaign ticket, which should actually be paid personally. Also, wealthy and large corporate donors may give money with strings attached, meaning the politician must support bills that will benefit the donor. If a major bill is on the table, a politician may try to add in an earmark to the bill, that basically adds extra money to the bill for a political interest. Much money is wasted this way, need I bring up the “bridge to nowhere” earmark? Lastly, all of this needs to be transparent, which it is not entirely.

America has been in the business of exporting its democratic model democracy has been experiencing structural deficiencies for quite some time and well before the PATRIOT ACT. It should still persist in beckoning for democratic change throughout the world but at the same time try to be a beacon of hope and change its way domestically. If the US admits it has gone astray from the democratic path and is trying to solve its problems, this gives more accountability to US foreign policy because it shows that the US is not perfect and is still transitioning itself to a full-fledged democracy.

Diamond's Democracy

This is a semi-book review of Larry Diamond's The Spirit of Democracy. I will probably list it in two to three parts.

Have no fear, democracy is here. Well kind of, is how Larry Diamond argues the prospects of democracy expanding the globe. Although he realizes there are many obstacles to achieving democracy in most regions of the world, there is at least progression and movement toward more democratic means and principles in governance and civil society. Diamond focuses on all the little improvements in societies from Latin America, Africa, and Asia to show that the spirit of democracy is alive and true; however, as he acknowledges, it remains to be seen whether these small steps will produce widespread democratic change. But to get to actual democratic change, society needs to support it, and Diamond believes that the pro-democracy attitude is taking shape. Referencing a 2001 World Values Survey that interviewed people from every region of the world asking to agree or disagree with statements on democratic values, over 80% of all respondents agreed that democracy is the best form of government and every region was over the 50% threshold (most further from 50%) on agreeing that leaders should not be dictators. Diamond utilizes this survey to support his optimism that democracy can, and will, flourish outside the West.
Diamond also focuses on the third wave of democracies, starting in the 1970s with Portugal and consists of countries such as Nepal, the fall of the USSR, Serbia, and Bosnia. This third wave can be sustained, or given into a fourth wave in the future, but he notes that there has been a recent reversal in democratic freedoms throughout the world, including the United States. The Middle East is the only region that has stagnated through the democratic third wave, not having any more freedom. Countries like Pakistan and Russia, which in the 1990s were emerging democracies, albeit with their many flaws, have returned to more autocratic ruling under Vladimir Putin and former president Pervez Musharraf. Both Putin and Musharraf have cracked down on the opposition, freedom of speech, and elections have not been free or fair. Other leading political parties in countries such as Nigeria and Venezuela hold on to power through amending the constitution and election fraud. There is no real explanation for the reverse-democracy movements, but many of these countries have been consolidating power since the start of the new century. Yet Diamond sees through this reversal and believes that these societies are pinning for democratic change.
Diamond uses many sources to support his research, including but not limited to academia, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, think tanks, news articles, and surveys. But he also uses and cites the independent organization Freedom House, which is a leader in analyzing and reporting on every country’s freedom while also supporting democracy and human rights around the globe. He utilizes Freedom House’s research on the freedoms allowed in a given country, consisting of civil and political rights as base for defining and listing democratic countries in order to back his own theories in the book. Additionally, Diamond uses Freedom House’s ‘freedom score’ to describe the positive or negative democratic progress in a country. For example, when writing about South Africa, he leads by stating that Freedom House recently downgraded South Africa’s freedom rating, and from there goes into South Africa’s political and societal problems.
Democracy can spread throughout the world but it will not do so overnight nor will it do so under a façade of democratic institutions, a.k.a. weak democracies. Democracy will only run its true course and be sustained when elements such as fair rule of law, popular sovereignty, and leadership accountability are implemented and followed. In short, these are the democratic values. Elections must be open and free. All candidates should be allowed access to run only because disallowing the opposition to run is counterproductive, such as in Iran and China. Diamond does make a point that elections are not enough to be called a democracy (even if the elections are free and fair). Rather there are certain elements that can make a democracy strong, as well as factors that make one weak.
Diamond points to ten elements that define strong democracies. The list contains aspects such as the right to expression, religion, to run for office, to vote freely; equality of all races and ethnic groups; independent judiciary and due process of law; balance of executive and legislative powers; civilian control over the armed forces, and; a functioning civil society. Countries that possess a majority of these elements are stronger democracies than the rest. Western states display them, although none of these countries can be labeled a perfect democracy, and most, especially America, are far from perfect. On the other hand, a political system like Jordan, where citizens can vote and enjoy democratic elements such as a constitution and elected assembly, but cannot vote the main leader out of power are what Diamond calls a pseudodemocracy. As seen in the name, pseudodemocracies are weak democracies. Weak political systems like Jordan’s obviously has consequences for citizens – they cannot effectively have a say in governing the country nor do they have a means of recourse if they oppose the rule of the leader. King Abdullah II retains authoritarian power even though his country has been influenced by the West and has opened up for some democratic values. A more proper term for Jordan may be an electoral authoritarian regime because the opposition does not really have a chance to campaign legitimately and are also bullied and threatened. Zimbabwe can fall into this category as it held elections (though far from free and fair) in 2002 and 2008, and supposedly has an elected assembly; yet Mugabe’s regime is not considered democratic. There is also racial and civil strife, no accountability on the leadership level, and corruption on all state levels in Zimbabwe. Again, just because a country has electoral systems that border free and fair, this does not constitute a democratic government. In sum, weak democracies exist because of the elites and their power structure, whereas strong democracies flourish not only because the leaders are willing to follow the law, but also because there is an active civil society.
But to get from a pseudodemocracy to a true democracy, it must be promoted, and there are multiple ways to do so. The most effective method is through regional cooperation and organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS) European Union (EU) and its affiliate organizations, and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The OAS has developed a regional approach to aiding or helping sustain democracy by sending observer missions to countries that may be in crises to alleviate the situation and dissuade a democratic pullback. Diamond notes that the observer mission leaves a lot to be desired, and much more is needed in OAS’s agenda to efficiently promote and develop democracy. The ICC is also a good example of an international organization that benefits the international community and promotes a democratic judicial system as well as rule of law.
Then there is political and developmental assistance that usually comes from other countries or organizations to a target country. Political assistance and developmental assistance are different, though both are usually tied to giving money. Of course no matter how much money or assistance is provided to a country, that country must have the political will to change its current political systems to a more democratic one. Yet these organizations do not just dole out money; the country must be viewed as either a strong potential candidate for democracy or be an emerging democracy. Organizations like USAID and UNDP can provide both, but the National Democratic Institute and European Commission affiliates, such as the Liaison Offices to potential EU candidate countries, focus on political change. Political assistance can include projects like improving judicial oversight by training judges, improving policing by training police, and domestic election monitoring. Development assistance usually consists of economic and financial projects.
Granted many current democratic states support and donate to various organizations like USAID and UNDP, a state’s foreign policy is also a good advocator of democracy – as long as it is not hypocritical. For example, the US urges many nations to transition to democracy with its help, yet US foreign policy also supports monarchies like Saudi Arabia and dictators like Hosani Mubarak of Egypt. This is conflicting and is used as political support for elite leaders running on anti-American campaigns. Nevertheless, any type of democratic assistance regardless of where it comes from or how it is issued should be concentrated on local civil society. Democracy building is more effective from the ground up and sometimes it is better to advert from funding the government.
In fact, just donating money directly to the government is one of the not so effective ways to promote democratic change. If the government is corrupt or lacks the will to change, then most likely the money will just go to the elites’ pockets. A good example of this is Pakistan, where close to $10 billion of aid money from the US has been donated to the country and not much of it is accounted for. This is a case in point in not using aid money efficiently. But if there are plans to aid a poor country in transition to democracy, one should not set absurd expectations for the country to meet goals. For instance, if electoral fraud is common, then it is infeasible to demand that the next election be fraud-free; rather if oversight improvements are made and ballot boxes are not stuffed as much as previously, it is a step in the right direction. Democratic change takes a while (230 years and counting for the US), it will certainly not take place overnight. At the same time one should not set expectations too low, provide aid unconditionally, or rely on promises that things will get done from the ruling elite. Gullibility and a lack of oversight of the aid program can give way to corruption and embezzlement. Therefore when providing democratic assistance, be it political or economic, there needs to be the right scale approach. Depending on the size of the country, the right amount of money and manpower needs to be utilized. Providing $30 million dollars may help the citizens of Malawi but it will only make a dent on the citizenry of Nigeria.
If democracy is promoted effectively to non-democracies, and here Diamond focuses on authoritarian states, it will help break the authoritarian changes but may not necessarily guarantee a regime change for the better. To successfully convert a state to democracy external and internal factors must both be present. External factors, like those mentioned above, would be that of economic and political assistance offered from other countries and organizations. Yet it needs to be leveraged, like a stick and carrot approach, where the funding for the government must be used to govern and must be distributed in a way that affects the majority of the population. In other words there needs to be conditionality, where the more cooperative and responsive governments get more money, usually in advance, for preparing the state to transition to more democratic means. Another leveraged policy tool is sanctions, which have been applied numerously to North Korea and Iran, but has not effected change thus far. More importantly, regional help from friendly neighboring states can transfer knowledge and democratic models across borders, perhaps taking part in a “snowballing effect,” as was seen in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism. Neighboring states can also apply foreign policies that encourage liberalism and human rights. But it must be noted that foreign policy and leverage/conditionality may not affect larger nations like China and Russia, and although democratization by force may be an option, after Iraq and Afghanistan it is ill advised.