Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa

I was able to attend a conference on the challenges and opportunities for conflict prevention in Africa. Taye-Brook Zerihoun, the UN Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Professor Muna Ndulo, Law Professor at Cornell University were the two main presenters at this conference. Both understand the role of history in the security situation in Africa and see it as significant but not as bad as it was in the 1990s or early 2000s.

Zerihoun's believes Africa's security crisis stems from colonialism and the drawing up of the borders by those European colonizers. From this history, African rulers consolidate power because this is their memory of rulers when they were young. Although there may be elections in African states, it is usually winner-takes-all, with no tyranny of democracy in place (Tyranny of democracy means that the loser in elections is fine with losing and does not contest the elections). The borders have exacerbated ethnic rivalries because tribes and resources have been split up between countries, rendering it harder for leaders to create a national identity or utilize their resources effectively for the entire population. This is also due to corruption and greed on the part of African rulers, but this is the way power is exercised in Africa. There is no transparency in the government nor is there recourse for opposition parties to express themselves. Any peaceful methods of replacing leaders are not accepted and often ignored in Africa. A case in point is the recent "election" in Cote d'Ivoire.

Zerihoun also blames international organizations, including the UN for faulty peace keeping operations and believes that the African Union and the UN need more of an equal relationship, whereas the UN will be seen as a more legitimate institution in African affairs. As the African Union lacks political will to carry the burden of peace and security in Africa, the AU and UN need to work together to combat the security problems within Africa. Specifically with elections in Africa, as they are a significant source of conflict and if there is UN presence (rather than just other African observers) during elections, then the process may be seen as more free and fair.

Ndulo came out stating that there are 4 causes of conflict in Africa: 1) authoritarian rule 2) exclusion of minorities from government 3) social/economic dilapidation 4) weak state structures. There needs to be a focus on democratic values in Africa, which will help resolve these sources of conflict. States (read 'ones in power') accumulate wealth and redistribute this wealth to cronies and family members. Money is not utilized for infrastructure projects, economic or social development. Thus to gain relief, the mechanisms of government need to be recreated, so that corruption and nepotism are stamped out. Further, government must be inclusive, protect the rights of its constituents, and understand that conflict is present in society and try to find ways to alleviate it. Particularly with the issue of gender, all Africans need to see the role of women not just as an inclusion to society but see it as a broadening and the transforming of African policy, ideology, and institutions. African society itself must be given more outlets for participation, which in turn should bring effective change to the security situation. When the pressure and emphasis is put on leaders to create change and hence, peace, they tend to hold the situation hostage, trying to gain something for themselves rather than gain something for the entire country.

These were the main recommendations presented by Zerihoun and Ndulo. Of course the real problem is the actual implementation of these recommendations. Implementation will only occur with a cultural shift in governance and leadership in Africa (many have said this). But how to bring this shift about remains to be seen. Education is not enough, because in many African countries, the state is the main employer and corruption is the name of the game. It does not pay to be an honest politician in a corrupt political system because it is a lose-lose outcome for the honest guy. All other politicians come out ahead because they work the system to their advantage, leaving those few honest politicians to whither away as they cannot push through any of their projects due to a lack of political will power on the part of the government as a whole. Yet these honest politicians are needed in Africa, they are the ones that can begin to shift the political paradigm toward a more democratic system. It is just that these politicians need to unite and secure backing by the international community, who would need to turn away from their economic interests and support social/political change. Of course, this is easier said than done.

Militarized aid or no aid?

In an interesting article on Foreign Affairs, Michael Young writes about the inefficiencies of humanitarian aid distributed via military or security firms in his piece entitled "Development at Gunpoint." He calls this "militarized aid." Young makes the case for aid being distributed solely by NGOs or organizations unrelated to the military because in this way the organization can be impartial to those it serves and those it serves will not be seen as a collaborator with the the 'enemy' force. Further he says that militarized aid damages the stabilization effort in the area. Militarized aid is nothing new; the US military has been known for giving out food and water to effected populations during wartime activities. But militarized aid is new in this concept, because it encompasses activities more than distributing food and water, but rebuilding towns and communities.

The question to be asked is whether aid should be administered no matter what or by who or if it should only be administered if it is not un-stabilizing. In short, is aid from a military better than no aid? I believe that aid from anyone is better than no aid at all, even if aid comes from an extremist group, because although there may be propaganda tied to to the service, at least an effected population is getting help. Young says that there should be a civilian space that is more receptive to unbiased aid. This is true, and if safe havens could be established, like those set up in Sri Lanka and Bosnia during wars in the 1990s, then this discussion would be over. But safe havens are not always feasible, in fact, most of the time they are not. For instance, Somalia could benefit from a safe haven but there is no conceivable way a safe, impartial, civilian space could be created due to the large presence of al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. The current wars are more dangerous than those previous, and the civilian space with NGOs do not really exist anymore.

Moreover the community may be targeted either way, if they receive aid from a military service or from an unrelated organization. If it comes down to security, then a military or security service are probably the best service providers. The military is trained in security, one cannot always count them as inefficient aid providers. Militaries are usually better prepared and better equipped to deal with disasters or to operate in war zones. However if the warring factions can guarantee security to a given aid group, then it would be more practical for a regular aid agency to do business.

Another problem with aid in general is that it has the ability to find its way to the government of the country that requires aid. I agree with Young on this point. This is undoubtedly a problem, and yes, resources that end up in government coffers are more likely to come from another government agency than an NGO. The money that is given to the government is needed for the civilian population, but most of that money never makes it to the public. Sometimes governments can distribute money and resources through the NGO rather than the country's government, such as the US government funding the National Democratic Institute (although this is not an aid agency).

With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the forefront of aid necessity, security agencies may be better off to administer to affected populations, but to care for this population effectively is probably best put in the hands of NGOs and organizations unrelated to the security apparatus. Aid agencies are in it for the long haul as opposed to militaries which are bound to move on to the next location as their main goal is to win the conflict at hand (Young did not neglect this argument). But if getting aid to the needy is the primary goal, then it should not matter from whom it is from, what depends is the length of time that the affected population will need aid. Short-term would be sufficient for a military or security agency, long-term would better be situated for an NGO.

Part II: World on Fire Meets Wars, Guns, and Votes

In conjunction with the previous post, below is the rest of commentary for the questions:

Both Amy Chua in World on Fire and Paul Collier in Wars, Guns, and Votes, are critical of the way that the developed world has tried to build democracies in failed and fragile states. How do their opinions agree, how do they differ and how do their prescriptions mesh with the optimism of Larry Diamond in his book Spirit of Democracy?

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So what are Chua’s and Collier’s solutions to the problems of implementing democracy in the developing world? What both suggest is to level the playing field for the poor populations in the face of the market dominant minorities and the corrupt politicians. The economic and political benefits of the ruling minority need to be spread evenly across the population, such as through income redistribution and welfare systems. But to get to a more level playing field, both Chua and Collier have their own versions on how to accomplish this feat.

Chua suggests that countries with MDMs need to utilize domestic government intervention in order to create policies that spread economic and political benefits to the population. Policies could include affirmative action programs and ethnic quotas in corporations and universities, such as was seen from Malaysia’s New Economic Policy in the 1970s. Domestic governments can also encourage (or force) MDMs to voluntarily contribute to society, including donating money for education reform, infrastructure, hospitals. This policy has had success with Indians in Kenya, who have helped create the University of Nairobi and have expanded employee benefits to include free healthcare and even corporate housing. Voluntary contributions will help the MDM’s public reputation and show that they work for the good of the public interest. In addition, Chua calls on Western governments to change foreign policy and stop propping up dictators based on economic and national security interests. The West needs to promote full-fledge democracy, not just elections, and remain supportive of these countries in their long transition to democracy, regardless of the interests the West has at stake.

Collier takes Chua’s argument a step further and advocates direct intervention from the West to implement democracy. (Chua never calls for direct intervention.) A military intervention can contain political violence in a country, at the same time promoting stability through security and accountability of government. In short, the West’s intervention in the bottom billion will establish democratic principles in the political system that would guarantee accountability and security. Collier is skeptical that democracy would not flourish otherwise, especially for those small, multiple identity countries which lack the political will to provide services to its citizens. These countries could create regional partnerships and cooperatives to lessen their economic burdens by pooling their resources, but this leads to disputes over who owns what and how profits are divided when combining resources. Therefore the West needs to step in to help the bottom billion reform to achieve economic prosperity. This can only be done through having accountable governments who provide security for their citizens.

What the intervention system would aim to accomplish is to educate politicians on how, in a democratic society, to acquire power and spend public money. How this intervention system would work is as follows: Bottom billion countries can opt-in to the system of intervention, thereby not imposing democracy on any country and dispelling any accusations of colonialism. The international community will commit to those countries entered in the pact that should a coup d’état occur, intervention will take place to restore the rightful government. This pact between the international community and governments oversees and guards the electoral process. By safeguarding the elected government, these politicians would be encouraged to build accountability with the public through their spending measures. Bottom billion countries subsidize 1/3 of their expenditures with foreign monetary aid; thus donors would put pressure on these governments to spend the money on economic development schemes as well as be transparent in their spending. Donors could also link their monetary contributions to the level of military spending, where for every dollar a country foregoes spending on the military, they would be rewarded financially. In sum, the international community would be the gatekeeper of the bottom billion in hopes that elections would become violence-free, military spending would be cut, and politicians would become accountable.

In comparison to Larry Diamond’s optimism of the flourishing of democracy world wide in Spirit of Democracy, both Chua and Collier have more sobering assessments of democracy and its progression. Where Diamond appreciates little successes as a step in the right direction, Chua and Collier believe that any previous democratic measure implemented in the developing world should not be counted as success because it has brought about violence. Systematic change is needed for any democratic development. Granted Diamond does not argue that those democratic measures present in the developing world equals success, but democracy and accountability can grow from them. Chua and Diamond are also in favor that a stronger, more accountable democracy can be built on what these countries already have, where Collier is more inclined to believe that because these are farce democracies, international intervention will help countries start anew. But all three authors agree that democracy will not be implemented overnight nor will it do so under a façade of democratic institutions. Democracy and its values, including fair rule of law, popular sovereignty, and leadership accountability can only be implemented and sustained through the right policies and external help.

To sustain the pro-democracy attitude of the developing world that Diamond references, Chua’s prescriptions to change government internally and have the West foment state-building via foreign policy are more inclined to do so. Her mechanisms of change, such as creating affirmative action programs, MDM contribution programs, and giving the population a stake in the economy, are more feasible for the success of democracy as the changes come from within. Suggesting the West alter foreign policy to be more consistent and democratic as a way to equally encourage all countries to go through the transition is also in line with Diamond’s philosophy. Collier’s call for intervention by the international community does not fall within Diamond’s own arsenal for democratic promotion; nevertheless its goal to bring accountability and security to the bottom billion optimizes the potential for democratic development. Specifically with peacekeeping, Collier has found that it reduces violence in post-conflict situations, which is a positive aspect for his initiative of intervention but also stabilizes a country fresh out of conflict.

Chua’s and Collier’s solutions are not similar, but the goal is similar – promote, implement, and sustain democracy. They appear to be cautiously optimistic that if their solutions are implemented, democracy would begin to flourish in the developing world. It would be gradual and incremental change, but so long there is improvement for the majority, then real progress will be made. Diamond would agree. The three authors are aware that elections do not equate to democracy and that no matter what improvements are made politically, there is no guarantee in eradicating poor practices, such as repressing freedom of speech or instigating nationalist movements against a minority. States that encompass the latter and do not follow the standards of Western democracy are not legitimate democratic governments, but usually ones who are corrupt, greedy, and power hungry. Throughout many countries of the developing world, honest and effective leadership is uncommon. Help is needed from the outside world, be it through foreign policy initiatives or intervention, to get the bottom billion on the right track to democracy.

Part I: World on Fire Meets Wars, Guns, and Votes

The following two posts will address the following question:

Both Amy Chua in World on Fire and Paul Collier in Wars, Guns, and Votes, are critical of the way that the developed world has tried to build democracies in failed and fragile states. How do their opinions agree, how do they differ and how do their prescriptions mesh with the optimism of Larry Diamond in his book Spirit of Democracy?

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From what one can gather if one read’s both Amy Chua’s World on Fire and Paul Collier’s Wars, Guns, and Votes is that if one does not either live in the developed, democratic Western world, or is not a rich elite in a the developing world, then one will lead a difficult life. Globalization helps spread democracy around the world, but the democracy that many countries implement is not the quintessential Western democracy. In fact the democracy that the developing world employs is one that benefits those in power, politically and economically, and does little to enhance the lives of the average citizens. The problem is practical, and in a way, definitional. Developing country elites want to implement enough democratic measures, such as multi-party elections, to keep receiving money from donors but at the same time tend to redefine democracy to fit their own needs. Chua and Collier both agree that democracy must represent more than elections or majority rule. The liberty and equality which is inscribed in Western democracy must also flourish in the developing world.

Chua’s and Collier’s arguments have many commonalities but also differ in certain regards. The main difference is that Chua argues from a market-based perspective, underlining how market dominant minority ethnic groups hold all the economic power in many developing countries. The insistence of democracy in these countries has not led to a freer competition; rather it has led to violence and greed. Collier’s argument is more political, focusing on the violence that occurs in his ‘bottom billion’ because 1) democratic values are not instituted and 2) the economies of these countries are weak. They both offer solutions for these problems: Chua opts on the side of internal democratic change where Collier is a proponent of external intervention to achieve change.

What Chua aims to set straight is that democracy is not a cure-all for ethnic and political violence around the world, but that democracy is a catalyst of violence, especially in the developing world. Western-style democracy, which is supported and encouraged around the world by America and Europe, hold high the effects of political liberalization, elections, and the empowerment of civil society. Hence the West will donate money to developing countries that embrace these principles of democracy as well as open up their markets to free competition. However Chua points out problems that are caused by both democracy and free markets – two things the West believe go hand in hand. The implementation of “free” markets and democracy has helped many market-dominant minorities take economic and political control of the countries in which they reside. The market dominant minority (MDM) is a small ethnic group that controls most of a country’s economy through their financial transactions and holdings. For example, the Chinese in the Philippines control over 90% of the economy and Indians disproportionately run the Kenyan economy – although the Kikuyu tribe has had success as well. In instances such as these, the pursuit of democracy has not led to country-wide prosperity and peace. What tend to result are three scenarios: backlash against the markets and the MDM’s financial holdings; reversal of democracy at the expense of the majority population or MDM, or; violence directed against the MDM.

The situation in Zimbabwe encompasses all three scenarios. Colonial Zimbabwe saw the British become the prosperous outsider group, overtaking the majority of arable farm land and capitalizing on agricultural trade. Since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, democracy was ushered in with the first free elections crowning Robert Mugabe president. Many Englishmen, the market dominant minority, stayed in the country and have retained ownership of the commercial farming land and larger agricultural market for generations. Although Mugabe ran on the nationalistic platform of “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans” and promises to nationalize and redistribute white farmland, he held off on his promises due to IMF austerity plans. These “belt tightening, free market” (pg. 130) plans only made the economic situation worse for the poor black Zimbabweans. As a result, Mugabe’s political influence began to wane, thus reverting to his call to seize white farmland and redistribute it to the poor black majority. Since the early 2000s, Mugabe has enacted this nationalization policy, which has altered the market-based economy toward socialism and more importantly, has led to a decrease in commercial farming production. This policy has also encouraged and led to violent attacks against white farmers and their land. Mobs would descend onto a farm, pillage property, kill livestock, and set the house on fire.

Consequently, the white landowners have financially backed the opposition political party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) since the 2000 elections. They are hoping to ensure constitutional changes that protect minorities and their surrounding property in Zimbabwe. But each election since 2000, Mugabe has run on the nationalist platform and there have been cases of corruption, ballot-stuffing, and intimidation by Mugabe’s Zanu PF party. The MDC has won seats in the parliament and has also obtained a power-sharing deal between Robert Mugabe and MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai. However this deal has been skewed in favor of Mugabe by Mugabe himself, confirming the backlash against democracy as Mugabe’s grip on power has not been loosened.

Chua emphasizes the fact that democratic elections and political liberalizations are seen as a vent for frustrations for the poor majority, many times calling for physical violence and deportation of the market dominant minority. Besides Mugabe in Zimbabwe, other examples include the fierce, nationalistic rhetoric of the Serbs in the Former Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic (“Serbia for Serbs”) and the genocide of the politically powerful minority Tutsi by the Hutus in Rwanda in 1994. The implementation of democracy does not automatically create rational citizens; if they are disadvantaged on account of an MDM they can be easily swayed to support the ‘demagogue’ who demonizes the MDM. In short, the demagogue will create an ethno-nationalist movement with the sole goal of taking back the wealth and dominance of the MDM for the poor majority.

In addition, MDMs can be in cahoots with the dictators or presidents and participate in crony capitalism. A prime example is Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos of the Philippines in the 1970s, who extorted money from the ethnic Chinese business class in return for access to resources and business contracts. The economic success of these MDMs and the access to the resources and wealth of their respective countries has only produced hatred and resentment from the ethnic poor majority, as shown above. This is the main reason why if democracy were to come about in the developing world, constitutional measures to protect the minorities and their property must be instituted. If not, it may encourage MDM’s to leave the country and take their capital with them.

Collier agrees that democracy and free markets do not necessarily bring about free, fair, and prosperous societies. His research shows that although democracy can reduce political violence, it depends on the economic level of the country. For instance, in middle income countries, political violence is reduced by democracy, but in countries with low incomes, democracy has enhanced political violence. Chua’s Zimbabwe example speaks to this effect that in poor countries with a median or lower income of $2,700 (pg. 22), democracy does not alleviate the dangers that already exist. However unlike Chua, who focuses on the surrounding political and economic situation of market dominant minorities in their respective countries, Collier tries to explain and generalize why democracy enhances political violence in poor countries. What he finds is that democracy in these countries does not generate freedom of the press nor the infrastructure to pass on information, such as electricity and roads. Rather knowledge is scarce and information on leaders is very biased. Therefore the electorate bases their vote on three scenarios. Firstly, the electorate will vote based on the actions of the president and how they were affected by his/her policies. Secondly, identity politics can be utilized where ethnic groups or tribes vote for those politicians who are of the same background. Lastly, the electorate is co-opted, bribed, or intimidated not to vote. Hence if democracy only means elections, true democratic reform will never happen.

Further, Collier focuses his attention on the lack of political accountability, specifically checks and balances, and security that prohibit the spread of democracy in his ‘bottom billion’ countries. However Collier’s main concerns are similar to Chua’s backlash against democracy scenario. Regarding accountability, in corrupt political environments, and corrupt societies as a whole, those moral citizens who seek to be elected realize that morality will not win over corruptness. Therefore either the potential, moral politician decides not to run or if he does run, there is good chance he too may become corrupt in order to survive the political game. Naturally the problem with corrupt politicians is that they are the ones that hold the country’s future and ultimately make the decisions in developing the state democratically. And because there is no checks and balance system, politicians do as they please and trust is lost between them and their constituents. Trust is also weaker between ethnic groups. For example, in Kenya diversity of tribes does not give the country a vibrant democracy as compared with the diversity of America; rather diversity has hindered economic growth as voting is usually along ethnic lines, regardless of performance of politicians. A system of checks and balances would help keep politics impartial in Kenya to the benefit of society, such as is seen in Belgium and Canada.

Security is the other factor that is needed to stabilize countries and advance democracy. What Collier reports is that the size of the country defines the potential for violence. Larger countries tend to be safer and smaller countries tend to be more violent because security is based on economies of scale. Smaller countries usually have fewer resources, less access to wealth, and less space for political participation, so these countries need to spend more than large countries on their security apparatus to keep the country from civil strife. In addition, if these small countries are extremely poor, such as the bottom billion, military spending is higher because violence is more likely due to limited economic opportunities. Particularly in post-conflict societies, military spending is increased in preparation for more war and paying for this security diverts funds from other forms of economic development. In bottom billion countries, 40% of aid money is spent on the military, which hampers societal development and steals money needed to improve living standards. Collier points out that even with high military spending, violence is not always quelled; it also enhances repression of political opponents, going against any democratic principles. In sum, stabilization and development do not come with guns, especially for small, poor countries that need to create economic opportunities for its population.

Both Collier and Chua explain that democratic development in the developing world tends to obstruct economic and governmental reform rather than support reform. Holding elections without enforcing the rules and crony capitalism do no good in ethnically divided societies. Subsequently, democratic development is not in the interest of the politicians, as they will lose their power and access to wealth as democracy expands. Those democratic measures that are already implemented are not beneficial to everyone in the country, usually putting the market dominant minorities and politicians in a position to gain more access to markets and wealth. As they are the ones in power, they can manipulate democracy to their advantage or do just do away with it, bringing about authoritarian states. For example, Collier lists seven potential options that a president can take during campaign season. Only one option is moral and falls across democratic lines: that is to run a free and fair election. The other six options detail how a president can retain power undemocratically. Collier also asserts that accountability is impeded by a lack of a collective, national identity in each country and the lax tax burden on citizens, which has not reached levels where citizens demand accountability of their leaders.