This is the second part of the paper, discussing Algeria's road to state failure. This is not implying that Algeria is a failed state, but that is exhibits those factors of a failed state discussed in the previous post.

Algeria is a unique case as it experienced a violent struggle for independence, underwent a long period of calm and economic progress, opened its doors to democracy, but remains a military autocracy. After the civil war with France for independence in the 1950s, the new post-colonial government led by Ben Bella and the National Liberation Front (FLN) could not use the newfound Algerian nationalism to its advantage as the FLN splintered due to arguments of who and how the country should be run. Like most post-colonial governments the FLN ran a (Islamic) socialist campaign with policies intended to lift the poor out of poverty and into a modern state. During Ben Bella’s reign, no social and economic services were provided because there was no political will to deliver the services. What happened in Algeria next is much like what has happened to many other African countries on the verge of failure, the military stepped in and consolidated political power within its own institution. In 1965, a military coup led by Boumedienne ended Ben Bella’s reign and assumed the political, economic, and social problems inherited from the civil war. Boumedienne presided over Algeria under the FLN banner as well because only one-party rule was allowed at the time.

Boumedienne’s presidency until the late 1970s exhibited a relative peace and successful economic development. He developed Algeria through industrialization, specifically though oil and gas exports that garnered economic growth, moving Algeria through the ranks of other African countries to becoming a modern, industrialized state. Boumedienne successfully turned Algeria around from the political, social, and economic demise that came under Ben Bella’s regime. But when Boumedienne died in the late 1970s during the oil crisis, Algeria again began to slump economically, losing revenue on oil while experiencing high unemployment and inflation. There were also food shortages and cuts in electricity and water, which does not make for a happy population.

Unfortunately for the Algerian citizens, all this turmoil could not just be blamed on the faltering economy. The new military and FLN leader, Chadli Benjedid took over after Boumedienne’s death and decided that economic and political reform was needed to get out of Algeria’s crisis. The reforms did not have the intended outcomes, and actually led to governmental corruption, a large dependence on oil, and a growing foreign debt that needed to be repaid. Algerian citizens were growing largely frustrated with the inefficiency of the FLN, and this culminated in the 1988 work strikes and food riots. The FLN called in the army to restore order, and they killed and tortured thousands of Algerians, which further delegitimized the government in eyes of public. What resulted was an appeasement of the public by the FLN, who instituted multi-party elections in 1991, with the belief that they would win regardless. To the detriment of the FLN, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an opposition political party won the first round of elections due to large scale disdain for the FLN. As background, FIS is an Islamic political party that wants to do away with all things Western in Algerian society, specifically democracy, and runs on a platform of social justice and creation of jobs. FIS was barred from the second round of elections as the military again stepped in and ensured the FLN remained in power. The military eventually banned all political parties based on religion in March 1997.

This move to ban the FIS from running resulted in another civil war that claimed close to 150,000 Algerian lives and also deposed the incumbent president Benjedid. Yet some democratic processes remained intact after the canceled elections of 1991, namely the multiparty political system and freedom of the press. Throughout the 1990s, the military held support from a portion of the population who were suspicious of the FIS and their Islamic outlook, yet still partook in a policy of repression and violence when necessary in Algeria. Needless to say, throughout most of Algeria’s post-colonial history, the military and state-security services have been the arbiters of power in Algeria and backed all presidential candidates that won elections in the 1990s, some which were FLN military leaders. The military was able to consolidate political power unto itself because it was the one institution in Algerian society that did not crumble due to poor economic strategy and social disorder; in fact the military cashed in on the oil wealth, using this money to pay its soldiers as well as pay rents to other actors willing to accept military direction. Lastly, the Algerian military, like many other African militaries in power, used the threat of internal disorder to strengthen its power grip on society.

According to Ayittey, a dispute over the electoral process and a resulting military intervention is usually the first steps to the destruction of a (African) country. The usual reason is because the military was unwilling to give up its power and wealth it took in from oil exports. The late 1990s up to recent times has actually seen the decrease of military control over the political system under the independent president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who himself was backed by the military when he first won presidency in 1999. He has amended the constitution so that there are no term limits for presidents, consolidated power away from the military, reaps the benefits of the export earnings of oil, and is becoming the ultimate autocrat. Although Bouteflicka tries to promote open elections, his election wins in 2004 and 2009 were not considered free and fair by opposition parties.

There may be little hope for Algeria that the UNDP’s assessment putting Algeria on the “brink of complete social disintegration” (Ayittey 13) will not become true. A 2004 survey in Algeria found that approximately 85% believe democracy is the best system of government for their country but also split on whether religion should influence political decisions. But this belief in democracy has not changed the political or economic system in Algeria. The government controls most of the economy and is weary of foreign direct investment. There is still government corruption pertaining to infrastructure and other development projects, high unemployment, and social upheaval regarding opposition terrorist factions attacking the government. Moreover there is a large amount of the population that lives in poverty and is awaiting the government to improve their living standards. What Algeria needs is to liberalize the economy to spur investment and development, which in turn would lead to social changes and perhaps a culture that resembled the Boumedienne era, which would then lead to a more efficient democracy.