Both Amy Chua in World on Fire and Paul Collier in Wars, Guns, and Votes, are critical of the way that the developed world has tried to build democracies in failed and fragile states. How do their opinions agree, how do they differ and how do their prescriptions mesh with the optimism of Larry Diamond in his book Spirit of Democracy?
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From what one can gather if one read’s both Amy Chua’s World on Fire and Paul Collier’s Wars, Guns, and Votes is that if one does not either live in the developed, democratic Western world, or is not a rich elite in a the developing world, then one will lead a difficult life. Globalization helps spread democracy around the world, but the democracy that many countries implement is not the quintessential Western democracy. In fact the democracy that the developing world employs is one that benefits those in power, politically and economically, and does little to enhance the lives of the average citizens. The problem is practical, and in a way, definitional. Developing country elites want to implement enough democratic measures, such as multi-party elections, to keep receiving money from donors but at the same time tend to redefine democracy to fit their own needs. Chua and Collier both agree that democracy must represent more than elections or majority rule. The liberty and equality which is inscribed in Western democracy must also flourish in the developing world.
Chua’s and Collier’s arguments have many commonalities but also differ in certain regards. The main difference is that Chua argues from a market-based perspective, underlining how market dominant minority ethnic groups hold all the economic power in many developing countries. The insistence of democracy in these countries has not led to a freer competition; rather it has led to violence and greed. Collier’s argument is more political, focusing on the violence that occurs in his ‘bottom billion’ because 1) democratic values are not instituted and 2) the economies of these countries are weak. They both offer solutions for these problems: Chua opts on the side of internal democratic change where Collier is a proponent of external intervention to achieve change.
What Chua aims to set straight is that democracy is not a cure-all for ethnic and political violence around the world, but that democracy is a catalyst of violence, especially in the developing world. Western-style democracy, which is supported and encouraged around the world by America and Europe, hold high the effects of political liberalization, elections, and the empowerment of civil society. Hence the West will donate money to developing countries that embrace these principles of democracy as well as open up their markets to free competition. However Chua points out problems that are caused by both democracy and free markets – two things the West believe go hand in hand. The implementation of “free” markets and democracy has helped many market-dominant minorities take economic and political control of the countries in which they reside. The market dominant minority (MDM) is a small ethnic group that controls most of a country’s economy through their financial transactions and holdings. For example, the Chinese in the Philippines control over 90% of the economy and Indians disproportionately run the Kenyan economy – although the Kikuyu tribe has had success as well. In instances such as these, the pursuit of democracy has not led to country-wide prosperity and peace. What tend to result are three scenarios: backlash against the markets and the MDM’s financial holdings; reversal of democracy at the expense of the majority population or MDM, or; violence directed against the MDM.
The situation in Zimbabwe encompasses all three scenarios. Colonial Zimbabwe saw the British become the prosperous outsider group, overtaking the majority of arable farm land and capitalizing on agricultural trade. Since Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, democracy was ushered in with the first free elections crowning Robert Mugabe president. Many Englishmen, the market dominant minority, stayed in the country and have retained ownership of the commercial farming land and larger agricultural market for generations. Although Mugabe ran on the nationalistic platform of “Zimbabwe for Zimbabweans” and promises to nationalize and redistribute white farmland, he held off on his promises due to IMF austerity plans. These “belt tightening, free market” (pg. 130) plans only made the economic situation worse for the poor black Zimbabweans. As a result, Mugabe’s political influence began to wane, thus reverting to his call to seize white farmland and redistribute it to the poor black majority. Since the early 2000s, Mugabe has enacted this nationalization policy, which has altered the market-based economy toward socialism and more importantly, has led to a decrease in commercial farming production. This policy has also encouraged and led to violent attacks against white farmers and their land. Mobs would descend onto a farm, pillage property, kill livestock, and set the house on fire.
Consequently, the white landowners have financially backed the opposition political party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) since the 2000 elections. They are hoping to ensure constitutional changes that protect minorities and their surrounding property in Zimbabwe. But each election since 2000, Mugabe has run on the nationalist platform and there have been cases of corruption, ballot-stuffing, and intimidation by Mugabe’s Zanu PF party. The MDC has won seats in the parliament and has also obtained a power-sharing deal between Robert Mugabe and MDC’s Morgan Tsvangirai. However this deal has been skewed in favor of Mugabe by Mugabe himself, confirming the backlash against democracy as Mugabe’s grip on power has not been loosened.
Chua emphasizes the fact that democratic elections and political liberalizations are seen as a vent for frustrations for the poor majority, many times calling for physical violence and deportation of the market dominant minority. Besides Mugabe in Zimbabwe, other examples include the fierce, nationalistic rhetoric of the Serbs in the Former Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic (“Serbia for Serbs”) and the genocide of the politically powerful minority Tutsi by the Hutus in Rwanda in 1994. The implementation of democracy does not automatically create rational citizens; if they are disadvantaged on account of an MDM they can be easily swayed to support the ‘demagogue’ who demonizes the MDM. In short, the demagogue will create an ethno-nationalist movement with the sole goal of taking back the wealth and dominance of the MDM for the poor majority.
In addition, MDMs can be in cahoots with the dictators or presidents and participate in crony capitalism. A prime example is Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos of the Philippines in the 1970s, who extorted money from the ethnic Chinese business class in return for access to resources and business contracts. The economic success of these MDMs and the access to the resources and wealth of their respective countries has only produced hatred and resentment from the ethnic poor majority, as shown above. This is the main reason why if democracy were to come about in the developing world, constitutional measures to protect the minorities and their property must be instituted. If not, it may encourage MDM’s to leave the country and take their capital with them.
Collier agrees that democracy and free markets do not necessarily bring about free, fair, and prosperous societies. His research shows that although democracy can reduce political violence, it depends on the economic level of the country. For instance, in middle income countries, political violence is reduced by democracy, but in countries with low incomes, democracy has enhanced political violence. Chua’s Zimbabwe example speaks to this effect that in poor countries with a median or lower income of $2,700 (pg. 22), democracy does not alleviate the dangers that already exist. However unlike Chua, who focuses on the surrounding political and economic situation of market dominant minorities in their respective countries, Collier tries to explain and generalize why democracy enhances political violence in poor countries. What he finds is that democracy in these countries does not generate freedom of the press nor the infrastructure to pass on information, such as electricity and roads. Rather knowledge is scarce and information on leaders is very biased. Therefore the electorate bases their vote on three scenarios. Firstly, the electorate will vote based on the actions of the president and how they were affected by his/her policies. Secondly, identity politics can be utilized where ethnic groups or tribes vote for those politicians who are of the same background. Lastly, the electorate is co-opted, bribed, or intimidated not to vote. Hence if democracy only means elections, true democratic reform will never happen.
Further, Collier focuses his attention on the lack of political accountability, specifically checks and balances, and security that prohibit the spread of democracy in his ‘bottom billion’ countries. However Collier’s main concerns are similar to Chua’s backlash against democracy scenario. Regarding accountability, in corrupt political environments, and corrupt societies as a whole, those moral citizens who seek to be elected realize that morality will not win over corruptness. Therefore either the potential, moral politician decides not to run or if he does run, there is good chance he too may become corrupt in order to survive the political game. Naturally the problem with corrupt politicians is that they are the ones that hold the country’s future and ultimately make the decisions in developing the state democratically. And because there is no checks and balance system, politicians do as they please and trust is lost between them and their constituents. Trust is also weaker between ethnic groups. For example, in Kenya diversity of tribes does not give the country a vibrant democracy as compared with the diversity of America; rather diversity has hindered economic growth as voting is usually along ethnic lines, regardless of performance of politicians. A system of checks and balances would help keep politics impartial in Kenya to the benefit of society, such as is seen in Belgium and Canada.
Security is the other factor that is needed to stabilize countries and advance democracy. What Collier reports is that the size of the country defines the potential for violence. Larger countries tend to be safer and smaller countries tend to be more violent because security is based on economies of scale. Smaller countries usually have fewer resources, less access to wealth, and less space for political participation, so these countries need to spend more than large countries on their security apparatus to keep the country from civil strife. In addition, if these small countries are extremely poor, such as the bottom billion, military spending is higher because violence is more likely due to limited economic opportunities. Particularly in post-conflict societies, military spending is increased in preparation for more war and paying for this security diverts funds from other forms of economic development. In bottom billion countries, 40% of aid money is spent on the military, which hampers societal development and steals money needed to improve living standards. Collier points out that even with high military spending, violence is not always quelled; it also enhances repression of political opponents, going against any democratic principles. In sum, stabilization and development do not come with guns, especially for small, poor countries that need to create economic opportunities for its population.
Both Collier and Chua explain that democratic development in the developing world tends to obstruct economic and governmental reform rather than support reform. Holding elections without enforcing the rules and crony capitalism do no good in ethnically divided societies. Subsequently, democratic development is not in the interest of the politicians, as they will lose their power and access to wealth as democracy expands. Those democratic measures that are already implemented are not beneficial to everyone in the country, usually putting the market dominant minorities and politicians in a position to gain more access to markets and wealth. As they are the ones in power, they can manipulate democracy to their advantage or do just do away with it, bringing about authoritarian states. For example, Collier lists seven potential options that a president can take during campaign season. Only one option is moral and falls across democratic lines: that is to run a free and fair election. The other six options detail how a president can retain power undemocratically. Collier also asserts that accountability is impeded by a lack of a collective, national identity in each country and the lax tax burden on citizens, which has not reached levels where citizens demand accountability of their leaders.
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